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THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
OUT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS OWN
"TRILOGY" OF DECISIONS: HAS THE CELOTEX
ERA ARRIVED?
Glenn S. Koppel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a trilogy
of decisions that revolutionized summary judgment practice
in federal courts and redefined the relationship between
judge and jury.' In the wake of the revolutionary 1995 court
2
of appeal decision in Union Bank v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court handed down its own trilogy of
3
decisions on summary judgment in California. Within an
eight-month period, this stunning series of carefully
sequenced landmark decisions laid down the law on summary
judgment in California and ended six years of silence by the
high court on the subject. These three decisions extend the
reach of summary judgment to resolve issues traditionally
California's trilogy
reserved for jury determination.
challenges everyone with a stake in the state's civil justice
system to reconsider the appropriate balance between the
values of judicial efficiency and full and fair access to the
courts.
The trilogy moves California extremely close to the
federal standard, and answers the question left unresolved
* Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School; B.A., City College of New York.
1. The federal trilogy of decisions comprises Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
3. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000); Saelzler v. Advanced
Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001); Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493
(Cal. 2001).
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after Union Bank of whether a moving defendant must
conclusively negate an essential element of the plaintiffs case
to support its summary judgment motion.4 Justice Stanley
Mosk, however, in what would be his last opinion, carefully
circumscribed the reach of the court's opinion in Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. by stating that California has not made
a "wholesale adoption" of the federal summary judgment law.5
This article explores how close the trilogy has brought
California's summary judgment practice to its federal
counterpart and what significant differences, if any, remain.
Part II briefly surveys the development of summary
judgment law in California leading up to the recent trilogy.
Part III.A analyzes the opinions in Guz v. Bechtel National,
Inc.,' Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400,' and Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Company.8 Guz, Saelzler and Aguilar each
arise out of the defendant's use of summary judgment to
secure a dismissal of the plaintiffs claims.9 In each decision,
the California Supreme Court held that the defendant had
met its movant's burden to show that an element of plaintiffs
cause of action could not be "established,"" which shifted the
burden to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue existed.
Ultimately, in each of the decisions, the Court held that the
plaintiff failed to meet this burden." The issue of shifting
summary judgment burdens has long been a controversial
one in California jurisprudence, because it addresses the ease
with which a moving defendant can force the plaintiff to
assemble its case on paper before trial to support his right to
proceed to a full-blown trial on the merits." Part III.B
4. Six years ago, commentators interpreted Union Bank as ushering in the
federal standard as defined in the federal trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions.

See ROBERT I. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE

GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 10.24, 10.243 (Justice William F.
Rylaarsdam et al. eds., 1996). Such sweeping statements about Union Bank,
however, were premature. See infra Part II.F. The recent Guz-Saelzler-Aguilar
trilogy of California Supreme Court summary judgment decisions render these
broad predictions far more accurate today.
5. See Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 511 n.15.
6. 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
7. 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001).
8. 24 P.3d 493 (Cal. 2001).
9. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1089; Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1148; Aguilar, 24 P.3d at
502-03.
10. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (2002).
11. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1124; Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147; Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 520.
12. For a review of the controversy in the California courts over the ease
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examines the impact of each decision in the trilogy on how it
Part III.C
shifts the defendant's burden of production.
plaintiffs
responding
the
on
impact
decision's
explores each
Supreme
U.S.
the
burden of production. Part III.D compares
Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judgment decisions, which
marked a watershed in federal summary judgment practice,
with its recent California counterpart, noting the striking
similarities between the two. Both trilogies signaled the end
of summary judgment's traditional status as a procedural
pariah, incorporating the procedure into the mainstream of
Additionally,. the trilogies
case management tools. 13
dramatically expanded the role of summary judgment to
include the determination of issues previously within the
exclusive province of the jury. 4 Part III.D also explores the
with which the moving defendant can shift the summary judgment burden to
the plaintiff, see Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 36373 (Ct. App. 1999). For a critique of the defendant's use of summary judgment
after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy as a tactic to
force plaintiffs to conduct needless discovery to develop its case prior to trial to
defeat summary judgment, see Jeffrey Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The
Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict,
and The Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988). Stempel writes,
Thus, Anderson... may require total development of a claimant's case
prior to trial. This is counterproductive. Why require a plaintiff to take
needless depositions when he or she could call those witnesses at trial?
An attorney would be bordering on
This expense is avoidable.
malpractice, in light of Anderson, if he or she failed to muster all the
evidence in support of the essential elements of the client's case on the
motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 172. See also Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 111 (1990) ("Summary
judgment under Celotex provides a unidirectional rule allowing defendants to
force plaintiffs to reveal trial strategies while not forcing reciprocal disclosure
by defendants.").
13. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which
are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action."' (quoting FED. R. CIV. PROC. 1)); Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 508-09.
14. See, for example, Justice Brennan's dissent in Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268 (1986), opining that the majority's decision in
Anderson may erode the constitutionally enshrined role of the jury, and Justice
White's dissent in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 601 (1986), stating that "the court makes a number of assumptions that
invade the factfinder's province." See also Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1157 (Kennard,
J., dissenting) ("The majority's errors deprive plaintiff of her constitutional
right to a trial by jury. A judge ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not
sitting as a trier of fact. When, as here, the plaintiff has a triable issue of
material fact it is the jury that must decide the issue.").
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practical impact of the federal trilogy on summary judgment
practice, and draws lessons from the federal experience for
California courts as they carry out the mandate of the
California Supreme Court's trilogy of decisions. Part IV
discusses the politics of summary judgment, focusing on the
ongoing activity in the California legislature to effect a
counterrevolution in summary judgment by statutorily
overruling the trilogy. Part IV concludes with an appeal for a
balanced approach to summary judgment that proceeds from
a public interest perspective, rather than from the
perspective of special interest groups lobbying the legislature
to manipulate summary judgment procedure to achieve a
tactical litigation advantage.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

All About Burdens: Establishing the Analytical
Framework
For a substantial part of the twentieth century, both
federal and California courts have struggled to determine
"how and when the movant's burden has been satisfied, when
the burden shifts to the opposing party, and how the
opponent may defeat a properly supported summaryjudgment motion."' 5 Making sense of the confusion requires a
clear understanding of the burdens of production and
persuasion,both at the summary judgment stage and at trial,
and how those burdens relate to each other. In the words of
Justice Mosk, "how the parties moving for, and opposing,
summary judgment may each carry their burden of
persuasion and/or production [on summary judgment]
depends on which would bear what burden of proof at trial."'6
1. Summary Judgment Burdens
The party moving for summary judgment bears two
burdens: a burden of production and a burden of persuasion.'7
15. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
PROCEDURE § 2727, at 463-64 (3d ed. 1998).
16. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 510.

AL.,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

17. As the California Supreme Court explained,
First.... the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden

of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

...

AND
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These two distinct burdens are sometimes commingled under
the umbrella term "burden of proof' which can muddy
summary judgment analysis.
In his opinion in Aguilar, Justice Mosk meticulously
8
reviewed the progression of summary judgment burdens.
He concluded that the movant bears "an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence
of any triable issue of material fact."1 9 If the court determines
that the movant has carried that burden, the burden of
production is said to "shift" to the party opposing the motion,
the respondent, to make a showing sufficient to forestall
summary judgment. 0 The respondent must therefore, "make
a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact."21 If the court determines that the moving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing to carry its
burden of production, then the burden does not shift to the
respondent and the court denies the motion.22
23
The movant also bears a burden of persuasion. Unlike
the burden of production, the burden of persuasion never
Second,... the party moving for summary judgment bears an
initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.
Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 510. Likewise, Justice Brennan's dissension in Celotex:
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on
the party moving for summary judgment. This burden has two distinct
components: an initial burden of production, which shifts to the
nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate
burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party.
Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
18. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 510-11.
19. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2739, at 391-92 ("'Where the
evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no 6pposing
evidentiary matter is presented."' (alteration in original) (quoting from The
Advisory Committee Note to the 1963 Amendments to Rule 56)). See also
WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL

PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 14:123 (Steven J. Adamski et al. eds., 2001)
("Because summary judgment is a 'drastic device,' cutting off a party's right to
present his or her case to the jury, the moving party bears a 'heavy burden' of
demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact."); Celotex, 477 U.S. at
336 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Celotex' failure to fulfill this simple requirement
constituted a failure to discharge its initial burden of production under Rule 56,
and thereby rendered summary judgment improper.").
23. See Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 510.
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shifts to the opposing party and requires the movant to
establish in the mind of the court a "requisite degree of
belief"24' that summary judgment should be granted because
there is no triable issue of material fact.25 If the court,
considering all the evidence presented by the moving and
responding parties, is persuaded that there is no triable issue
of material fact, the court will grant the motion.26
2. Trial Burdens
At trial, the law of evidence imposes upon the party
asserting a cause of action, or a defense to a cause of action,
both an initial burden of production and a burden of
persuasion."

The burden of production operates during the course of
the trial, "empower[ing] the judge to decide the case without
28
jury consideration when a party fails to sustain the burden.
The party who initially bears the production burden must
24. Id. The "requisite degree of belief' depends on the issue to be
determined. At trial, the "burden of [persuasion] may require a party to raise a
reasonable doubt concerning the existence or nonexistence of a fact or that he
establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact by a preponderance of the
evidence, by clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
CAL. EVID. CODE §115. On summary judgment,
The burden of persuasion imposed on a moving party by Rule 56 is a
stringent one. Summary judgment should not be granted unless it is
clear that a trial is unnecessary ... and any doubt as to the existence
of a genuine issue for trial should be resolved against the moving
party. In determining whether a moving party has met its burden of
persuasion, the court is obliged to take account of the entire setting of
the case and must consider all papers of record as well as any
materials prepared for the motion .... "[Ilf... there is any evidence in
the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the
[nonmoving party's] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply
cannot obtain a summary judgment .... "
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir. 1983)). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, §2727, at
455-58 ("Before summary judgment will be granted it must be clear what the
truth is and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will
be resolved against the movant.").
25. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102
(9th Cir. 2000) ("In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the
motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there is no genuine
issue of material fact.").
26. Id.
27. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §336, at 409 (5th ed.
1999).
28. Id.
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come forward with evidence sufficient to permit a "reasonable
jury" to render a verdict based on reason as opposed to mere
speculation.2 9 If the court determines that the party failed to
carry its initial production burden, the court will remove the
case from the jury by granting a directed verdict." The court
will issue a directed verdict when there is "but one reasonable
conclusion as to the verdict."3' The burden of production can
shift to the adversary if "in the judge's view the proponent
has not merely offered evidence from which reasonable people
could draw the inference of the truth of the fact alleged, but
evidence from which (in the absence of evidence from the
adversary) reasonable people could not help but draw this
inference. 2
The burden of persuasion, by contrast, never shifts and
"becomes a crucial factor only if the parties have sustained
their burdens of producing evidence and only when all of the
evidence has been introduced."3 3 The persuasion burden
operates only at the decision stage to guide the jury's
deliberations. 4 For instance, the judge will instruct the
jurors how to decide "if their minds are left in doubt."" In the
ordinary civil case, the party bearing the burden of
persuasion must convince the jury that its version of the
truth is more likely than not correct.36 If, after weighing the
evidence and evaluating each witness's credibility, the jury's
mind is in equipoise, it must render a verdict for the opposing
party.37 In certain civil cases, the court requires the jury to
reach an even higher level of belief. 8
29. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 50.
30. STRONG, supra note 27, at 409 ("The burden of producing evidence on an
issue means the liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed
verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been produced.").
31. Brady v. S. Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943).
32. STRONG, supra note 27, at 420 (emphasis added).

33. Id. at 409.
34. Id. at 410.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 421-22.
37. 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 70 (1986)

("When the evidence is in equipoise on a matter that a party must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence, summary judgment will be granted against

that party.").
38. STRONG, supra note 27, at 423.

For example, in a libel action by a

public figure against a newspaper, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
acted with "actual malice" and such malice must be shown with "convincing
clarity" so as not to impinge upon the speaker's First Amendment freedom of
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The Link Between Summary Judgment and Trial

Burdens
Through the courts' insistence on linking summary
judgment burdens with trial burdens, summary judgment
has evolved in federal court, and recently in California, from
a rarely granted, drastic measure to the workhorse of modern
case management techniques.39 This linking has increased
the power of the judge to dispose of claims on summary
judgment because the judge is allowed to act as though she
were ruling on a directed verdict motion made after the full
development of the evidence at trial." As will be discussed
below, the U.S. Supreme Court's linking of the trial burden of
persuasion, applicable to the jury's decision-making process,
to the respondent's summary judgment burden4" has
expanded the judge's role to include evaluating the
persuasiveness of the plaintiffs case, a function formerly
limited exclusively to the jury.42 California's recent summary
judgment trilogy follows the federal example in this respect.43
speech. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
39. See Robert K. Smits, Comment, Federal Summary Judgment: The "New"
Workhorse For An Overburdened Federal Court System, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
955, 967 (1987).
40. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 163-67.
41. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254 ("[Tlhere is no genuine issue if the evidence
presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow
a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.").
42. Professor Stempel notes,
By deciding, before full development of the record at trial, that the
nonmovant's side of a disputed factual story is not sufficiently
probative to support a verdict by a reasonable jury, the judge can more
easily eliminate not only claims that she finds unpersuasive in the
instant case but also legal rights with which she is unsympathetic.
Stempel, supranote 12, at 166.
43. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493 (Cal. 2001). The court
stated,
[I]n order to carry a [respondent's] burden of production [on summary
judgment] to make a prima facie showing that there is a triable issue of
the material fact of the existence of an unlawful conspiracy, a plaintiff,
who would bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence at
trial, must present evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact
to find in his favor on the unlawful conspiracy issue by a preponderance
of the evidence, that is, to find an unlawful conspiracy more likely than
not.
Id. at 511 (emphasis added). See also Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d
1143, 1161 (Cal. 2001) (Werdergar, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority
misunderstands the substantial factor test, improperly suggesting it burdens
plaintiff with proving it 'more probable than not'.., that defendants'
carelessness caused her injuries.") (emphasis added).
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The TraditionalView of California Summary Judgment:
A "DrasticMeasure"44
Summary judgment originated in England as a plaintiffs
motion.4 ' The procedure was designed to facilitate debt
collection by allowing a plaintiff creditor to pierce sham
defenses interposed in a debtor's answer by showing that
there was no dispute as to the agreement between creditor
The moving
and debtor and the fact of nonpayment.4 '
plaintiff thereby could shift to the defendant debtor a pretrial burden to submit affidavits supporting its defense of
If the defendant could not show any
non-payment.47
supporting documents in its defense, or if the defense was a
"sham or frivolous," the court could enter a judgment for the
creditor without trial.4
In 1933, California's legislature adopted summary
judgment, but made it available only to plaintiffs.4 9 The
federal rules, adopted in 1938, contained Rule 56, which
made summary judgment available to both plaintiffs and
California followed suit, making summary
defendants. 0
judgment available to defendants in 1939.1
From 1938 until the federal trilogy of cases in 1986,
federal courts struggled to determine "how and when the
movant's burden has been satisfied, when the burden shifts
to the opposing party, and how the opponent 5may defeat a
properly supported summary judgment motion."
Wright, Miller and Kane, in their leading treatise on
federal procedure, observe that "much of the confusion in the
[federal] decisions as to the showing required on a summaryjudgment motion stems from the divergent views various
B.

44. Justice Stanley Mosk stated in his opinion in Molko v. Holy Spirit
Ass'n., 762 P.2d 46, 53 (Cal. 1988), that "[s]ummary judgment is a drastic
measure that deprives the losing party of a trial on the merits. It should
therefore be used with caution, so that it does not become a substitute for trial."
45. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 134.
46. See id. (citing Charles E. Clark & William Samenow, The Summary
Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 424 (1929)); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15,
at 191-92.
47. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 134.
48. Id. at 137-40.
49. See Walsh v. Walsh, 116 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. 1941).
50. See WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 15, at 192-93.
51. See Walsh, 116 P.2d at 64.
52. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at 463-64.
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judges have had as to the utility and application of Rule 56.""3
Some judges, wary of the potential of summary judgment to
become a summary trial by affidavits, have adopted a
cautious or hostile stance toward the procedure, labeling it a
"drastic" or disfavored measure. 54 Other judges see summary
judgment as a key case management tool, designed to avoid
wasting judicial resources on a trial, the outcome of which is
clear at the pretrial stage.55 These divergent attitudes toward
the appropriate role of summary judgment have been the
source of much confusion in federal summary judgment case
law56 and, as this article demonstrates, in California
summary judgment cases as well.57
The opinions of Judge Jerome N. Frank and Judge
Charles E. Clark in the Second Circuit case of Arnstein v.
Porter starkly illustrated these divergent views."
Judge
Frank was "outspokenly critical of the summary judgment
procedure,"5 while Judge Clark, "the principal draftsman of
the federal rules, acted as the spokesman for those
sympathetic to Rule 56. "6

In his copyright infringement action, Arnstein testified in
his deposition that Cole Porter had plagiarized some of his
musical compositions, while Porter, in his deposition
testimony, flatly denied having access to the compositions

53. Id. at 464.
54. See, for example, Eagle Oil & Ref Co., Inc. v. Prentice stating that
Because the procedure is summary and presented on affidavits without
the benefit of cross-examination, a trial by jury and opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses in giving their testimony, the
affidavits filed on behalf of the [nonmoving] defendant should be
liberally construed to the end that he will not be summarily deprived of
the full hearing available at a trial of the action and the rights incident
thereto ....
The procedure is drastic and should be used with caution
in order that it may not become a substitute for existing methods in the
determination of issues of fact.
122 P.2d 264, 265 (Cal. 1942). See also Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46,
53 (Cal. 1988) ("Summary judgment is a drastic measure that deprives the
losing party of a trial on the merits. It should therefore be used with caution, so
that it does not become a substitute for trial." (citations omitted)).
55. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
56. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at 464.
57. See discussion infra notes 152-93.
58. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at 464-65.
59. Id. at 465 n.9.
60. Id. at 464.

2002]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

493

The federal district court granted
and copying them. 6'
Porter's summary judgment motion, which was reversed on
appeal.6 2 The appeal centered on the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact regarding Porter's access to the
plaintiffs songs.63 Judge Frank and Judge Clark crossed
swords over whether the jury should be allowed to determine
the plaintiffs and defendant's credibility at trial.64
Judge Frank, writing for the court, demonstrated a
cautious, almost hostile, attitude toward summary judgment
that emphasized the paramount value of preserving issues of
credibility for the jury." Noting that depositions should not
"supplant the right to call and [cross] examine the adverse
party... before the jury,"66 Judge Frank wrote that
"[p]laintiff, or a lawyer on his behalf on [cross-examination of
defendant] may elicit damaging admissions from defendant;
more important, plaintiff may persuade the jury, observing
defendant's manner when testifying, that defendant is
unworthy of belief."67 Judge Frank was especially concerned
about foreclosing cross-examination where the case turned on
witness credibility, "especially as to matters peculiarly within
defendant's knowledge."66 Where the case turned on the
defendant's credibility, as it did in Arnstein,6 Judge Frank
believed that the defendant's credibility created a triable
issue, even where "the plaintiff. .. has offered nothing [on
summary judgment] which discredits the honesty of the
defendant... ."'0 Judge Frank urged caution in granting
61. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d. Cir. 1946).
62. Id. at 468, 475.
63. Id. at 469.
64. For example, Judge Frank noted that "[allthough part of plaintiffs
testimony on deposition (as to 'stooges' and the like) does seem 'fantastic,' yet
plaintiffs credibility, even as to those improbabilities, should be left to the
jury." Id. at 469. Judge Clark responded that "cross-examination can hardly
construct a whole case without some factual basis on which to start." Id. at 478
(Clark, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 469-71.
66. Id. at 470.
67. Id. Judge Frank also noted that deposition testimony is a weak
substitute for "oral testimony of the witness, in the presence of the Court and
Jury." Id. (quoting Hammock v. McBride & McBride, 6 Ga. 178, 183 (1849)
(Lumpkin, J., dictum)).
68. Id. at 471.
69. Id. at 469 ("With credibility a vital factor, plaintiff is entitled to a trial
where the jury can observe the witnesses while testifying.").
70. Id. at 471.

494
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summary judgment to avoid transforming the procedure into
a "trial by affidavits."7'
Judge Clark's dissent in Arnstein presages the Supreme
Court's opinion in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett2 forty years later
by emphasizing that summary judgment under Rule 56 is not
"disfavored," but rather is "an integral and useful part of the
procedural system envisaged by the rules."7 Judge Clark
concluded,
Of course it is error to deny trial when there is a genuine
dispute of facts; but it is just as much error - perhaps

more in cases of hardship, or where impetus is given to
strike suits - to deny or postpone judgment where the
ultimate legal result is clearly indicated.74
Until 1986, federal courts sided with Judge Frank's
cautious approach to summary judgment, "perceiving it as
threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the
right to confront witnesses, the right of the jury to make
inferences and determinations of credibility, and the right to
have one's cause advocated by counsel before a jury."71 Until
the Celotex opinion, the federal courts widely shared an
interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Adickes v.
S.H. Kress that a moving defendant must submit affirmative

71. Id.
72. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
73. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 479.
74. Id. at 480.
75. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 77. Notwithstanding the
value Judge Frank placed on the opportunity a trial presents for the jury to
assess the demeanor of witnesses and the value of cross-examining those
witnesses, the federal courts have generally refused to deny summary judgment
on the "mere allegation that the opponent desires to rest his case on the
credibility of the witnesses." See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.3,
at 463 (3d ed. 1999). To forestall summary judgment on credibility grounds, the
opposing party must controvert the moving party's affidavits or provide
evidence to impeach those affidavits. See id. Consistent with this view,
California's summary judgment statute specifically prohibits denying summary
judgment "on grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of
witnesses furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary
judgment...." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(e) (2002). Evidence that the
movant's witness is interested in the outcome of trial, however, can create a
genuine issue of credibility for trial. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, at 463 ("If the
opponent can show some reason why the movant's witness might be disbelieved
at trial, as, for example, if the witness would profit personally from an outcome
in favor of the movant, summary judgment is inappropriate as the credibility of
the witness clearly is in issue.").
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evidence to negate the plaintiffs case."6 Furthermore, the
federal courts denied summary judgment when there was the
"slightest doubt" as to the facts.77
California courts traditionally pursued the cautious
approach to summary judgment. Justice Mosk, in his 1988
opinion in Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, reiterated the blackletter characterization of summary judgment as a "drastic
measure that deprives the losing party of a trial on the
merits... [and] should therefore be used with caution, so
78
that it does not become a substitute for trial." In adopting
this cautious approach, California courts, like Judge Frank,
placed a premium on "a trial by jury and opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses in giving their
To avoid the potential for transforming
testimony."79
summary judgment into a substitute for trial, California
courts adopted a prophylactic summary judgment standard
that imposed a heavy burden on the moving defendant to
conclusively negate, by affirmative evidence, an essential
element of the plaintiffs case even though the defendant
°
would not bear such a burden of production at trial. The
See Issacharoff &
76. Adickes v. S.H. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 80 ("Nonetheless, Adickes was widely
interpreted to require a movant for summary judgment to 'foreclose the
possibility' that the nonmovant might prevail at trial."); see also Melissa L.
Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 63-64 & n.56 (1988).
77. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.15, at 269 (5th ed.
2001).

As originally drafted, Rule 56 contemplated that summary judgment
would be a readily available procedural device used in conjunction with
the broad discovery afforded by the Federal Rules. A series of decisions
by the courts of appeal, however, held that the motion could not be
granted when there was the "slightest doubt" as to the facts. Since
such a doubt about the facts almost always exists, even after a jury
verdict, this definition of the threshold sharply constricted the use of
summary judgment. That view influenced the decision in Adickes v. S.
H. Kress & Co.
Id.
78. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 53 (Cal. 1988); accord Walsh v.
Walsh, 116 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. 1941) ("By an unbroken line of decision in
[California] since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the
principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue
determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.");
Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 122 P.2d 264 (Cal. 1942).
79. Eagle Oil, 122 P.2d at 265.
80. See Aguilar:
Language in certain decisions purportedly requiring a defendant
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Second District Court of Appeal in Barnes v. Blue Haven
Pools' expressly held that the trial burden of production has
no effect on the moving defendant's summary judgment
burden:
There is nothing in the [California summary judgment]
statute which lessens the burden of the moving party
simply because at the trial the resisting party would have
the burden of proof on the issue on which the summary
judgment is sought to be predicated. In such a case, on
the motion for summary judgment, the moving party must
generally negative the matters which the resisting party
would have to prove at the trial.82
The California Supreme Court in Molko also adopted this
view of the moving defendant's burden: "To succeed, the
defendant must conclusively negate a necessary element of
the plaintiffs case, and demonstrate that under no
hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the
process of a trial." 3
The traditional, cautious approach to summary judgment
can be more clearly understood within the context of what
one procedural commentator calls the "Open Courts"
paradigm of adjudicatory procedure that prevailed in federal
courts from 1938 through the mid-1980s.84 The liberal
moving for summary judgment to conclusively negate an element of the
plaintiffs cause of action derives from summary judgment law as it
stood prior to the 1992 and 1993 amendments [to the summary
judgment statute], does not reflect such law as it stands now, and is
accordingly disapproved.
Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 512 n.19 (Cal. 2001) (citations
omitted).
81. Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969). In
Barnes, the plaintiff was injured when he dove into a pool manufactured by the
defendant. Id. at 445. In a suit against the pool manufacturer, the plaintiff
alleged that the pool was too shallow for diving and that the diving board was
too large and too long. Id. at 446 n. 1. Defendant moved for summary judgment
based on plaintiffs discovery responses, which revealed he had no evidence to
prove the pool was defectively designed. The court held that defendant failed to
meet its movant's burden to "demonstrably show[ I a carefully constructed pool,
free of defects." Id. at 447. See also infra note 82 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 447 ("There are, of course, cases... where the moving defendant,
by its affidavits, effectively precluded any possibility of recovery by the plaintiff
in the absence of challenges to their veracity or completeness.").
83. Molko, 762 P.2d at 53.
84. Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 659, 714 (1993).
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85
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflects this paradigm. The
primary goal of the "Open Courts" paradigm was the "just
resolution of disputes."86 The federal rules employed a variety
of procedures to achieve the goal of open access to the courts
and to facilitate a determination of claims on the merits,
including simplifying the rules, relaxing pleading
requirements, and providing for broad discovery." Broad
discovery rules, for example, were intended to provide a "level
88
playing field by assuring equal access to proof." Most state
judicial systems, including California's, were greatly
influenced by the federal rules reform model of notice
The traditional view of
pleading and liberal discovery.
that should not be a
measure
drastic
a
as
summary judgment
the "Open Courts"
with
substitute for trial is consistent
paradigm's overriding concern that parties with meritorious
claims be afforded a full and fair opportunity to prove those
claims in court.

The U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 "Trilogy": Unleashing
Summary Judgment in FederalCourt
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a trilogy
°
of landmark summary judgment decisions that marked a
dramatic shift in the federal judiciary's attitude toward
summary judgment from a disfavored measure to the
C.

85. Id. at 716-17.
86. Id. at 714.
87. See id.
88. Edward D. Cavanaugh, A New World of Discovery; Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favor Well-Heeled
Litigants, S.F. RECORDER, Aug. 8, 1998, at 4; see JAMES, supra note 77, § 5.2, at
287 ("Since the enactment of the Federal Rules, wide mutual discovery ... has
made it possible to prosecute types of claims where relevant evidence is in the
hands of defendants, thus shifting the balance of advantage.").
89. See Edwin W. Green & Douglas S. Brown, Back to the Future:Proposals
for Restructuring Civil Discovery, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 225, 226 (1992) ("Modern
pleading and discovery burst onto the scene in California in 1958. The
California legislature modeled the California Discovery Act of 1957 ... after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... .") (internal quotation marks omitted);
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 75, § 7.1, at 386 ("[The federal] discovery rules
virtually revolutionized the practice of law in the United States. Of all the
Federal Rules, they have been the most widely copied; nearly every state has
adopted a similar set of provisions permitting broad, intensive discovery.").
90. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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"workhorse" of case management.
In a five to four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, made it easier for defendants to win
summary judgment motions in federal court by lessening the
moving defendant's burden.9
In reversing the court of
appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's
interpretation of Adickes that a defendant must submit
affirmative evidence to negate the opponent's claim.12
Declaring that "[s]ummary judgment procedure is not.., a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather ... an integral

part of the Federal Rules as a whole," the Supreme Court
held that "the burden on the moving [defendant] may be
discharged by 'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district
court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case."93 Celotex thereby alleviated the
burden on a moving defendant to show the nonexistence of a
triable issue when the defendant would not bear the burden
of production on that issue at trial. The broad language of
"showing... an absence of evidence" contrasts with
California's traditional requirement that the defendant
"conclusively negate, by affirmative evidence" an essential
element of plaintiffs case.94
In a five to four decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
9
Inc.," the U.S. Supreme Court again made it easier for judges
to grant summary judgment by increasing the burden on
responding plaintiffs to forestall summary judgment. In
Anderson, the Court equated a summary judgment motion
with a directed verdict motion, "6 holding that the "standard
[for granting a summary judgment] mirrors the standard for
91. Smits, supra note 39, at 967 ("In Celotex, the Court reduced the initial
burden of going forward to the moving party who will not have the burden of
proof at trial.").
92. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325.
93. Id. at 325.
94. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
95. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242.
96. The Court stated,
[Tihe genuine issue summary judgment standard is very close to the
reasonable jury directed verdict standard: The primary difference ...
is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before
trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict
motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been
admitted.
Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if,
under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable
conclusion as to the verdict."97 The Court's opinion in
Anderson required the district court to apply the burden of
persuasion applicable at trial when determining the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidentiary submission in
opposition to the summary judgment motion.98 Under this
new standard, the court, in ruling on summary judgment,
must determine 'whether there is [evidence] upon which a
jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party
99
producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed."'
Anderson involved a libel suit against a public figure in
which the applicable burden of persuasion at trial required
the jury to be convinced of the defendant newspaper's malice
by clear and convincing evidence."' Therefore, in applying
the respondent's burden standard from Anderson to
determine whether the plaintiffs evidence presented a
"genuine issue" for trial, the district court must evaluate
whether the "evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is
of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of
fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.''
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the
concern that the Court's reformulation of the summary
judgment standard would transform the judge's task on
summary judgment from determining the existence of a
triable issue to determining the triable issue itself.'
According to Justice Brennan, the majority's opinion directed
the district court to weigh the evidence, thereby transforming
what is meant to provide an expedited "summary" procedure
3
into a full-blown paper trial on the merits:0 "I would have
thought that a determination of the 'caliber and quantity,'
i.e., the importance and value, of the evidence in light of the
'quantum,' i.e., amount 'required,' could only be performed by

97. Id. at 250.
98. Id. at 252-53.
99. Id. at 252 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442,
448 (1871)).
100. Id. at 254.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 267 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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weighing the evidence." 10 4
In the third case in the trilogy, Matsushita Electrical
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Supreme Court, in
another five to four decision, effectively increased the
respondent's burden of an antitrust plaintiff in order to avoid
summary judgment.' °5 The Court required the district court
to assess the strength of plaintiffs evidence to determine
whether it created a genuine issue for trial.0 6 In Matsushita,
a group of American electronics manufacturers alleged that
certain Japanese companies had conspired to sell their
products below marginal cost to drive the plaintiffs out of the
American market.' 7 The trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment, which the court of appeals
reversed.0 8 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal
and characterized the plaintiffs' claims as "implausible"
because they "simply made no economic sense. '"09 Based upon
its finding that the plaintiffs' evidence was consistent with
two equally plausible competing inferences, the Court held
that the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to support a
rational inference by a jury of antitrust conspiracy." ° By so
holding, the Matsushita Court deprived the jury of its
traditional role of choosing between competing inferences.
Matsushita's impact on the respondent's burden extends
beyond the antitrust context. As a leading treatise on civil
procedure observed,
Consistent with the trend toward a more liberal expansive
use of summary judgment, the decision between
competing inferences is not always for the jury; it is
permissible for such a determination to be made by the
court in granting summary judgment if one of the
inferences is more plausible than the other."'
By eliminating the traditional restraints on summary
104. Id.
105. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
106. See id. at 600 (White, J., dissenting) ("Such language suggests that a
judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case
should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for
himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.").
107. See id. at 574.
108. Id. at 580.
109. Id. at 587.
110. See id. at 587-88.
111. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., supra note 75, at 459-60.
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judgment, the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy blurred the line
between "issue finding rather than issue determination,"
which the California Supreme Court found to be the "pivot
2
upon which [California] summary judgment law turns.""
The change of judicial attitude toward summary
judgment, reflected by the Supreme Court's trilogy, was part
of a wider shift in the public's attitude toward litigation.
During the 1980s, concern about unrestrained litigation,
popularly known as the "litigation explosion," became
widespread."' Professor Mullenix observed that a myth of
American litigiousness and litigation abuses pervaded
American culture in the 1980s and prompted demands for
4
civil justice reform designed to restrict access to the courts."
Business groups were instrumental in pressing for a "narrow
'5
application of the [Federal] Rules."" In Professor Stempel's
words, "the business community... saw itself victimized by
bogus or marginal claims that consumed legal resources and
actually could succeed at the hands of lay jurors ....""'
Summary judgment's movement into the mainstream of
7
case management techniques," fueled by the Supreme
Court's 1986 trilogy, is part of the larger effort to cut back on
8
litigation and litigation delay." As part of this effort, courts
112. Walsh v. Walsh, 116 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. 1941).
113. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1994) ("[T]he perception of discovery abuse has been
magnified by its connection to the even more widely held perception of an
American 'litigation explosion' and its allegedly dire consequences for this
country's economy and life.").
114. See id. at 1393-409.
115. Stempel, supra note 84, at 719.
116. Id. at 718.
117. See EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT - FEDERAL LAW
AND PRACTICE § 3.01 (2d ed. 2000) ("In the present contemporary milieu of

'managerial judging,' summary judgment's critical and efficacious function
places it in the very center of the present system of administering civil
litigation.").
118. Professor Stempel writes,
As almost anyone alive during the past decade knows, this is the era of
the "litigation explosion," or there is at least the perception that a
litigation explosion exists .... [Tihe perception of a litigation explosion
has spurred adoption of alternative dispute resolution methods,
tougher pleading standards, sterner and more readily available
sanctions for discovery abuse, more comprehensive pretrial
management of cases, more prevalent fee shifting or adoption of the
English Rule, and generally greater ease of pretrial disposition of
cases. In 1986, the effect of this trend upon federal summary judgment
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have employed a range of techniques that include aggressive
pretrial case management,"9 restrictions on discovery, and
20
court-sponsored alternative dispute resolution.1
California's judicial system is also burdened by an
increasing caseload"' and subject to pressure to "reduc[e] the
incidence and effect of litigation.""' Some of the efficiency
measures adopted by the California courts raise difficult
policy questions.
Specifically, what are the adverse
consequences on court access by the disadvantaged members
of society?" 3
One commentator concludes that recent
litigation reform measures designed to restrict access to the
courts "weigh[ ] more in favor of the socioeconomically
4
advantaged" at the expense of the disadvantaged.1
D.

1992-1993 Amendments: The Legislature's Response to
the U.S. Supreme Court's "Trilogy"
In 1992, the legislature amended California's summary
judgment statute to define the moving defendant's burden of
production. 1'
As amended, the California Code of Civil
Procedure ("CCP") § 437c(o)(2) provides that a moving
defendant must "show" that an essential element of the
practice became apparent.
Stempel, supra note 12, at 96-97.
119. See Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice
Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1562 (1994) ("Case management
is a subcategory of judicial administration, but in the last twenty years it has

become the primary administrative technique for reducing delay and cost in the
processing of cases.").
120. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 97-98; Sherman, supra note 119, at 1570
("Hybrid and new ADR methods emerged during the 1980s as private ADR

providers, community dispute resolution centers, and courts experimented with
the new processes.").

121. See John K. Hudzik, Financing and Managing the Finances of the
California Court System: Alternative Futures, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1813, 1832

(1993) ("IT]here is little in the above data or elsewhere to contradict the
commonly held view that California judicial system workloads will continue to

increase substantially during the next decade and beyond.").

122. Id. at 1840-41 ("When issuing its report on California's jobs and future,
the Council on California Competitiveness devoted significant attention to the

problems and costs of litigation in California. The bulk of their complaints and
the focus of most of their recommendations on this topic concern reducing the
incidence and effect of litigation.").
123. Id. at 1841 ("The important public policy question... which must be
addressed by the judiciary, policy makers, and the public, is how much access
and ease of access are we willing to fund?").

124. Stempel, supra note 84, at 695.
125. See ASSEMB. B. 2616, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).
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126
plaintiffs case "cannot be established." After the enactment

of the 1992 amendment, but before Union Bank,
commentators debated the meaning of this ambiguous
phrase. 127 Pro-Celotex commentators incorrectly interpreted
the phrase "cannot be established" to overrule the judicially
created requirement in Barnes that the moving defendant
bear a burden of production on summary judgment to
conclusively negate the plaintiffs case through affirmative
evidence.'28
In 1993, the legislature once again amended the
summary judgment statute to increase the burden on the
responding plaintiff to "set forth specific facts" to support its
claims, instead of "rely[ing] on the mere allegations or
denials of its pleadings."'29 This amendment, however, did
not address the movant's burden; rather, the 1993
amendment affected the respondent's burden by adding the
following language to § 437c(o)(1) and (2):
[The responding party] may not rely upon the mere
allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a
triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of
material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense
126. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (2002) ("A defendant. .. has met his
or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action... cannot be
established.").
127. See, for example, Curtis E.A. Karnow's article stating that
the statute remains opaque. It still places the burden of showing that
a cause of action has "no merit" on the defendant moving for summary
judgment .... While many interpretations of the new language are
conceivable, it probably will have the effect of continuing the
imposition on moving defendants to demonstrate a negative, that there
is no evidence of an essential element.
Curtis E.A. Karnow, Archeology of Error: Tracing California's Summary
Judgment Rule, 24 PAC. L.J. 1845, 1883-84 (1993). In comparison, see WEIL &
BROWN, supra note 4, at § 10.237, stating that "[tlhe 1992 amendments
represent a significant departure from former law. Legislative history shows it
was the legislature's intent to adopt the federal standards governing burden of
proof on summary judgment motions as expressed in Celotex." See also Hagen
v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 206 (Ct. App. 1995) ("There was an
initial debate as to whether the new statutory requirement of a showing that an
element 'cannot be established' effected any significant change from the
preexisting requirement that the defendant 'conclusively negate' the element.").
128. See Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics and Procedure: The Saga of
Summary Judgment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L.
REV. 455, 505 n.296 (1997).
129. ASSEMB. B. 498, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994).
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thereto.'

It is far from clear that the legislature, by enacting the
1992 and 1993 amendments to the summary judgment
statute, intended to follow the federal example in Celotex to
the extent of overruling Barnes."' Under the best of
circumstances, it is tricky business to divine the collective
intent of a group of legislators who are responsive to the
demands of a variety of interest groups." 2 The use of
legislative history to interpret the 1992 amendment is
particularly unenlightening because key legislators only
dimly understood the meaning of Celotex and were motivated
to read into that decision a meaning that best conformed to
the interests of their constituents. The legislative history
behind these amendments has been characterized as "murky"
and "remarkably obscure."'33
Notwithstanding the above, a rigorous analysis of the
convoluted legislative history behind the 1992 amendment
reveals that the bill's sponsor intended to equalize the
burdens on plaintiffs and defendants who move for summary
judgment."' California case law had required a moving
plaintiff to satisfy, in effect, two burdens, while requiring a
moving defendant to meet only one."3
The amendment
relieved the moving plaintiff from the burden of conclusively
proving up each element of its own claim as well as negating

130. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1), (2) (2002).
131. Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
132. Contemporary statutory interpretation scholarship debunks the fiction
that courts merely troll statutes for legislative intent. See, e.g., Jane S.
Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent:" Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110 (1995) ("The viability of such
'intentionalism' has long been discredited by scholars and is sharply
undermined by contemporary skepticism about objective theories of meaning
and about the pluralist political process from which statutes emerge.").
133. Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Ct. App.
1999) ("Most of the debate has centered on the legislative history of the
amendments, which was remarkably obscure considering the magnitude of the
potential change in the culture of California litigation.").
134. See Koppel, supra note 128, at 510-13.
135. See Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 659 (Ct. App.
1995); see also IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT TO CAL. SENATE
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. at 8 (Cal. 1992) ("Case law

currently requires a plaintiff seeking to obtain a summary judgment motion to
show both that it has proved up on the cause of action and negated any
applicable affirmative defenses.").
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the defendant's affirmative defenses." 6 The 1992 amendment
to California Civil Procedure Code § 437c(o)(1) now requires
the moving plaintiff only to prove each element of its cause of
action, thereby eliminating the additional burden to negate
the defendant's defenses.'37 The plaintiffs trial bar supported
the amendment because it made it easier for plaintiffs to
The sponsors of the bill
move for summary judgment.'
the elimination
as
supporting
opinion
interpreted the Celotex
139
burden.
second
of this
The report prepared by the Assembly Committee of the
Floor Coordinator that accompanied Assembly Bill 26161"°
supports the interpretation that the 1992 amendment was
intended to codify existing case law: "[Assembly Bill 2616]
[clarifies the burden of proof on summary adjudication and
summary judgment motions to codify state law as to the
defendant's burden of proof and changes the plaintiffs burden
of proof in accordance with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett .... "' Hence, the
report articulates the burden on the moving defendant in a
way that is consistent with Barnes.'
136. The text of§ 437c(o)(1) of the California Civil Procedure Code states:
A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing
that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved
each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on
that cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met
that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(1) (2002).
137. See id.

138. See Jeanna Steele, On Second Thought: The Plaintiffs Bar Sours on a
Summary Judgment Statute, CAL. LAw., July 2001, at 19 ("The plaintiffs bar
supported the amendment too, assuming that it would make it easier for
plaintiffs to move for summary judgment.").
139. CALIF. LEG., ASSEMB. DAILY JOURNAL, REP. TO THE GEN. ASSEMB. OF

1993-1994 (1993). Assemblyman Peace, the bill's principal sponsor, described
the bill as a "modified form" of the Celotex "rule." Id. ("AB 2616 adopted in a
modified form the rule of Celotex and overrode pre-existing California law by
providing that a plaintiff may obtain a summary judgment if it proves up the
allegations of its complaint.").
140. AsSEMB. COMM. OF THE FLOOR COORDINATOR, REPORT ON ASSEMB. B.
2616 (Cal. Aug. 25, 1992).
141. Id.; see also Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 653, 660-61
(Ct. App. 1995).
142. See REP. ON CAL. ASSEMB. B. 2616. See also supra notes 81-82; CALIF.
LEG., ASSEMB. DAILY JOURNAL, supra note 147 ("[T]his bill clarifies the burden

of proof on summary judgment by providing that a defendant has shown that its
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Despite the bill sponsor's assertion that the amendment
adhered to Celotex,'43 a historical analysis of the phrase
"cannot be established" 144 shows a lack of connection between
this phrase and Celotex in regard to the movant's burden.
The words "cannot be established" first appeared in the 1990
summary judgment statute to define when a cause of action
"has no merit" in connection with a summary adjudication
motion. 145

Because the 1990 statute failed to apply this

definition to summary judgment motions, which are virtually
identical to summary adjudication motions,'46 the 1992
amendment corrected this previous drafting error by applying
the definition of "has no merit" to motions for summary
adjudication and summary judgment.147

When the phrase

"cannot be established" made its statutory debut in 1990, no
one believed that this amendment would change the standard
for determining summary adjudication motions.'48 The court
of appeal, in Brantley v. Pisaro, confirmed the disconnect
between the phrase "cannot be established" and the federal
summary judgment standard as defined by Celotex by
observing that, "other than limit the issues for which
summary adjudication was available, the 1990 legislation was
not intended to change existing summary judgment law."'4 9
E.

Union Bank: The Second Appellate District Interprets the
1992-1993 Amendments to Overrule Barnes v. Blue
Haven Pools
In 1995, the Second Appellate District Court of Appeal

motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the defendant.., negates an
element of the plaintiffs cause(s) of action or proves up its affirmative
defense(s).").
143. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(o)(2) (2002).
145. S.B. 2594, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990); see also Brantley v. Pisaro,
50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[Tlhe phrase 'cannot be established'
was not new to section 437c in 1992. It first appeared in 1990, and was then
placed in subdivision (f), which dealt only with motions for summary
adjudication.").
146. The only difference between summary judgment and summary
adjudication is that "summary judgment terminates the action between the
parties and results in an immediate, appealable judgment," whereas
"[slummary adjudication orders do not terminate the action." WEIL & BROWN,
supra note 4, at § 10:34.
147. See Koppel, supra note 128, at 507-08.
148. See id.

149. Brantley, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (emphasis added).
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handed down its landmark opinion in Union Bank v. Superior
Court."'° Advocates of the federal burden-shifting procedure
under Celotex heralded Union Bank as "signaling a new era
The court of
in summary judgment practice in California."''
appeal in Union Bank acknowledged the ambiguity of the
words "cannot be established."'52 Relying on an erroneous
analysis of legislative history to interpret those words," 3 the
Union Bank court, in effect, declared that a moving defendant
is no longer bound by Barnes's requirement to conclusively
negate plaintiffs cause of action. The court fashioned a
narrow ruling that fell short of a wholesale adoption of
Celotex:
Taken together, the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section
437c legislatively overruled this division's holding in
Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools,... insofar as it prohibited a

summary judgment motion from being granted when a
moving defendant merely relies on a plaintiffs factually
Now, a moving
devoid interrogatory answers....
defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery
responses to shift the burden of proof pursuant to section
437c, subdivision (o)(2).""
Union Bank's interpretation of the 1992 and 1993
amendments reflecting the legislature's collective intent to
overrule Barnes has been uncritically accepted as holy writ
on the subject by courts and commentators."' Even Justice
150. Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
151. Hunter v. Pac. Mech. Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 337 (Ct. App. 1995);
see also Calvin House, Summary Shift, State Defendants Get Benefit Of Federal
Standard, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 6, 1995, at 7 ("The Union Bank decision should
settle the debate [over whether the legislature intended] to import the federal
standard [for shifting the burden of production from movant to respondent or
whether] a defendant still had to negate the plaintiffs case with evidence of his
or her own."); Evelio M. Grillo, Union Bank v. Superior Court- California's
Celotex, 9 CAL. LITIGATOR 210, 211 (Fall 1995).
152. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659 ("Because there is some
ambiguity as to the effect of the language 'one or more elements of the cause of
resort to
action.., cannot be established...' in the 1992 amendment,...
contemporaneous legislative history materials such as committee reports is
appropriate."). For a critique of the Union Bank decision, see Koppel, supra
note 128, at 509-24.
153. See Koppel, supra note 128, at 509-24.
154. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
155. See, e.g., Thomas Kallay, Managingthe Burdens Imposed on Motions for
Summary Judgment in California, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 68-84 (2000);
Steele, supra note 138, at 19. Thomas Kallay, an appellate sole practitioner,
opposed SB476, which would have statutorily overruled Union Bank.
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Mosk's opinion in Aguilar relies upon Union Bank's
interpretation of the 1992-1993 amendments. 5"
F. Union Bank's Aftermath of Confusion
Union Bank did not end the confusion created by the
1992 and 1993 amendments regarding the moving
defendant's burden on summary judgment. California courts
applied various summary judgment standards, ranging from
the "traditional" approach discussed earlier to that of
Celotex."7
Several California Supreme Court decisions handed
down after Union Bank, including Guz v. Bechtel National,
Inc. ,' the first case of the trilogy, continued to apply Barnes's
"conclusive negation" standard. 5'9 Some courts of appeal
continued to use the word "negate" to describe the burden of a
moving defendant on summary judgment. For example, in
Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center,6 ' the Second
District Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the
156. Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 509 n.10, 513 (Cal. 2001)
("T]he legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments contains certain
summaries at least arguably supporting the perdurance of the conclusive
negation requirement. But it was the 1992 and 1993 amendments 'that [were]
enacted, not any' such summary." (alteration in original)). Even Union Bank
conceded the ambiguity of the 1992 amendment, relying on legislative history
which the court of appeal in Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. characterized as
"remarkably obscure." Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360,
365 (Ct. App. 1999).
157. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
158. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
159. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 128 (Cal. 1999). See CalvilloSilva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1998); Kovatch v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co.,
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 227 (Ct. App. 1998); Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371
("The Supreme Court has not directly considered the issue and has persisted in
its use of the terminology from the older cases, thus perpetuating the doubts of
the courts still contending that the historic requirement of 'proving the
negative' continues to burden the moving party.").
160. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (Ct. App. 1997). Sada's post-Union Bank analysis
of the summary judgment burdens stems from pre-Union Bank case law that
applied the "negation" standard developed in Barnes:
Although the burden of proof in a title VII action claiming an
unjustifiable refusal to promote ultimately rests with the plaintiff, in
the case of a motion for summary judgment or summary issue
adjudication, the burden rests with the moving party to negate the
plaintiffs right to prevail on a particular issue. In other words, the
burden is reversed in the case of a summary issue adjudication or
summary judgment motion.
Univ. of S. Cal. v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268-69 (Ct. App. 1990)
(citations omitted). See Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
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defendant in an employment discrimination case, holding
that the affirmative evidence submitted by the moving
defendant failed to "negate" essential elements of the
plaintiffs case."' In Sada, the court ruled that the trial
burdens of production in an employment discrimination case
have no effect on summary judgment burdens of production."'
This ruling does not follow Celotex, which equates the
burdens at summary judgment with those at trial.'63 Citing
as authority the Sixth District's opinion in Addy v. Bliss &
Glennon,' the Sada court states that "'the burden rests with
the moving party to negate the plaintiffs right to prevail on a
particular issue... . [Iun other words, the [trial] burden is
reversed in the case of a... summary judgment motion."""
The court's opinion did not cite the Union Bank decision
issued by the Second District two years earlier.'
The Sixth District continued to cite Barnes after Union
Bank. Addy v. Bliss & Glennon was a 1996 employment
discrimination case in which the parties disputed the
applicable summary judgment standard.'67 Addy argued that
Bliss & Glennon ("B & G") was required to "negate each of the
theories of liability contained in the complaint."'68 B & G
contended that it "may show a cause of action has no merit
[merely] by pointing out to the court the absence of essential
evidence to support some element of plaintiffs case."6 9 The
court of appeal cited Barnes and agreed with Addy that "the
burden rests with the moving party to negate the plaintiffs
right to prevail on a particular issue."7 ° Although the court
161. See Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
162. See id. at 118.
163. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 327 (1986).
164. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Ct. App. 1996).
165. Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
166. See id. Sada's ruling that, in employment discrimination cases, the
summary judgment burdens are the reverse of the trial burdens conflicts with
another Second District decision issued three years earlier. Compare Sada, 65
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119, with Caldwell v. Paramount Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 448, 457 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating that, with respect to certain types of
employment discrimination cases, "the burdens of proof for purposes of a
defendant's motion for summary judgment are precisely the same" as those on
the parties before the court generally).
167. Addy, 51 Cal. Rptr 2d at 645.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 649 (citing Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (2d
Dist. 1969)).
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required the moving defendant to make an "affirmative
showing in support of his motion," the Addy court affirmed
summary judgment for defendant, holding that B & G had
met its burden and "submitted admissible evidence
demonstrating that Addy could not establish a prima facie
case [of employment discrimination]. " "'
Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Celotex, the First Appellate District's decision in Hunter v.
Pacific Mechanical Corp. 7' appeared to extend Union Bank's
narrow holding, interpreting the phrase "cannot be
established" to permit the moving defendant to simply "point
out" an absence of evidence on the plaintiffs side. 7 ' The
Celotex Court coined the phrase "point out,"'74 which has
become indelibly associated in California summary judgment
jurisprudence with the federal summary judgment standard
under Celotex.'7 ' The phrase, however, is ambiguous. A
minority of federal courts have interpreted the words "point
out" to relieve the moving defendant from the burden of
taking affirmative steps to assemble a prima facie case for
summary judgment, permitting the defendant to simply
argue the absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs case."'
Hunter was criticized by the Sixth Appellate District in Addy
for suggesting that "a moving defendant may shift the burden
by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove
its case."'77 Addy ruled that "a defendant must make an
171. Id. at 645. The court also held that B & G made an unrebutted showing
of "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not offering Addy the position."
Id. at 649.
172. Hunter v. Pac. Mech. Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995).
173. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
174. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) ("[T]he burden on the
moving party may be discharged by 'showing' - that is, pointing out to the
district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case." (emphasis added)).
175. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513 (Cal. 2001)
("Summary judgment law in this state, however, continues to require a
defendant moving for summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply
point out through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess.., needed
evidence. In this particular at least, it still diverges from federal law."
(emphasis added)).
176. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 22, § 14:137.1, at 14-32 (citing
Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000)); Cray
Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir.
1994).
177. Addy v. Bliss & Glennon, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 647 (Ct. App. 1996).
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affirmative showing in support of his or her motion," 7' 8
consistent with the view that California's summary judgment
statute "implies the ... need for concrete evidence from the
Hunter did not hold that a moving
moving party."7 '
defendant can simply allege or argue that the opposing party
has no evidence because the moving defendant in that case
submitted in support of its motion plaintiffs factually vague
deposition testimony. 8 ' The unsettled question was whether
factually vague discovery responses satisfied the statute's
implied requirement of "concrete evidence."18
In Hagen v. Hickenbottom, the Sixth Appellate District
interpreted the 1992 amendment to require the moving
defendant to make "an affirmative showing in support of his
or her motion ... [which] connotes something significantly
more than simply 'pointing out to the ...court' that 'there is
an absence of evidence' and adopted a middle view between a
full-blown Celotex standard and the traditional negation
view. ' Hagen further held,
178. Id. at 645.
179. Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 367 (Ct. App.
1999).
Unlike the federal rule described by Professor Wright, which he says
provides that the moving party "need not produce evidence, but simply
can argue that there is an absence of evidence," California's procedure
requires the moving party to support its motion with evidence in the
relatively elaborate form of separate statements. The court is neither
permitted to act sua sponte nor solely upon the basis of argument: "In
determining whether the papers show ... there is no triable issue as to
any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in
the papers.... and all inferences reasonably deducible from the
" ... The statute itself thus implies the corresponding
evidence ....
need for concrete evidence from the moving party and expressly
requires the moving party to supply more than the bare assertion,
whether alleged in a pleading or by way of argument, that the opposing
party has no evidence to support a particular claim.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
180. See id. at 371. In Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., the second appellate
district ruled that
a moving defendant need not support his motion with affirmative
evidence negating an essential element of the responding party's case.
Instead, the moving defendant may (through factually vague discovery
or otherwise) point to the absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs
case. When that is done, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present
evidence showing there is a triable issue of material fact.
50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 791 (Ct. App. 1996). Leslie G. was before the same
division of the second appellate district that decided Sada.
181. Hunter v. Pac. Mech. Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 338 (Ct. App. 1995).
182. Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 207 (Ct. App. 1995).
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Before the burden of producing even a prima facie case
should be shifted to the plaintiff in advance of trial, a
defendant who cannot negate an element of the plaintiffs
case should be required to produce direct or
circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff not only does not
have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain a prima facie
183
case.

The Hagen court anchored its holding in the requirement that
the defendant submit sufficient evidence (direct or
circumstantial) to show an absence of evidence to support the
plaintiffs case.'
Under Hagen's approach, the issue of the
movant's burden focuses on whether the discovery materials
offered by the moving defendant constitute sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support the inference that plaintiff
"not only does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain
a prima facie case."'85 Plaintiffs factually devoid discovery
responses may support this inference as long as the plaintiff
has had reasonable opportunity to discover its case.'86
Hagen, however, cautioned that "the burden should not
shift without a stringent review of the direct, circumstantial
and inferential evidence,""' recognizing that not all discovery
responses would qualify.'8 8 For example, the Hagen court
held that the plaintiffs "'factually vague' deposition
responses," 9 similar to those submitted by the moving
183. Id.
184. Id. at 208-09.
185. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 207-08 (noting that the nonmoving plaintiff in Union Bank could
have, but did not, seek a continuance for further investigation or discovery).
187. See Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 372 (Ct.
App. 1999) (characterizing the court's view in Hagen).
188. Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208 ("The Union Bank court subsequently
made clear that not every discovery response which does not further the
adversary's case will suffice in and of itself to show that the case 'cannot be
established."').
189. Id. In Hagen, the plaintiffs brought an action to set aside a trust on the
theory that the defendant exercised undue influence over the decedent. Id. at
198. The moving defendant did not rely on any of the plaintiffs factually devoid
interrogatory answers but, rather, upon the plaintiffs "factually vague"
deposition testimony that indicated that plaintiffs did not have personal
knowledge of undue influence by defendant. Id. at 203. While acknowledging
that the record suggested that the plaintiffs' "prospects of ultimately [winning
were] slight," the court nevertheless held that the defendant failed to meet its
burden to show the plaintiffs could not establish undue influence because they
"almost certainly would not have been present" had such undue influence
occurred. Id. at 208. The court held, therefore, that the burden did not shift to
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defendant in Hunter,9' did not support an inference that the
plaintiff could not reasonably expect to obtain a prima facie
case at trial.' Hagen carefully distinguished between "a case
92
that is simply weak and a case that 'cannot be established.""
The California Supreme Court's trilogy ultimately
adopted the Hagen court's interpretation of the 1992
amendment. It moved summary judgment in the Celotex
direction by moving beyond the pre-Celotex and pre-Union
Bank "conclusive negation" standard, and rejected the
interpretation of Hunter that apparently allowed the moving
9
defendant to simply assert or argue the absence of evidence.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
"TRILOGY"

A. A Brief Introduction to California's"Trilogy" of Summary
Judgment Decisions:Guz, Saelzler and Aguilar
This section presents a brief sketch of the facts of each
decision in the California trilogy, which lays a foundation for
the analysis of the impact of these decisions on the movant's
burden' and the respondent's burden.
the plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case. Id. at 209.
190. Id. at 208; Hunter v. Pac. Mech. Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 336-39 (Ct.
App. 1995). In Hunter, plaintiff Hunter, a bricklayer at various construction
sites, sued defendant PMC, a contractor, claiming that he sustained asbestosrelated injuries through exposure to asbestos as a result of working in close
proximity to PMC employees. Hunter, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. In affirming
summary judgment for PMC, the court recognized that PMC's reliance on
Hunter's factually vague deposition testimony, that he was personally unaware
of PMC's activities at any of the job sites at which he worked, was sufficient to
shift the burden to Hunter, who was unable to establish a triable issue of fact
that PMC's activities were a substantial factor in causing his injuries. Id. at
339. The court of appeal held that Hunter's lack of personal knowledge
satisfied PMC's burden to point out the absence of proof by Hunter on
causation. See id. The Hagen court "respectfully questioned" Hunter's
conclusion "that 'factually vague' deposition responses by the plaintiff himself
sufficed, in the circumstances of that case, to shift the burden to the plaintiff."
Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208 (emphasis added).
191. Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208-09.
192. Id. at 209. The Hagen court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' "prospects
of ultimately proving undue influence [were] slight." Id.
193. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513 (Cal. 2001)
("Summary judgment law in this state.., continues to require a defendant
moving for summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply point out
through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably
obtain, needed evidence.").
194. See infra Part III.B.
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1. Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
John Guz was forty-nine years old when he lost his job
after Bechtel National, Inc. ("Bechtel") eliminated his work
1 96
unit and transferred its tasks to another Bechtel office.
Guz brought a wrongful discharge action against Bechtel in
California Superior Court asserting three claims: an age
discrimination claim under California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act ("FEHA") statute,'97 breach of an implied
contract to be terminated only for good cause, and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9
The trial court granted summary judgment for Bechtel
and dismissed the action.'99 "The court reasoned that '[Guz]
was an at-will employee and has not introduced any evidence
that he was ever told at any time that he had permanent
employment or that he would be retained as long as he was
doing a good job."'2 ° Furthermore, the court ruled that Guz
failed to present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie
case of age discrimination, and failed to produce sufficient
evidence to rebut Bechtel's nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating his employment. 0 '
The court of appeal reversed the lower court in a two to
one decision.2 2 In regard to Guz's breach of contract claim,
the court found that "Guz's longevity, promotions, raises, and
favorable performance reviews, together with Bechtel's
written progressive discipline policy, and Bechtel officials'
statements of company practices, raised a triable issue that
Guz had an implied-in-fact contract to be dismissed only for
good cause."2 3 As to the age discrimination claim, the court
found that a triable issue existed regarding whether Bechtel's
proffered reason for discharging Guz, a downturn in business,
was a pretext for unlawful age discrimination.!
The California Supreme Court, over a strongly worded
dissent by Justice Kennard, reversed the court of appeal's
195. See infra Part III.C.
196. Guz v. Betchel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2001).
197. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12941 (Deering 1999).

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1094.
Id.
Id. at 1099 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
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ruling on Guz's breach of contract claim, finding that "neither
the policies, nor other evidence, suggest any contractual
restriction on Bechtel's right to eliminate a work unit as it
The Court also reversed the lower appellate
saw fit."'2°
court's ruling on Guz's age discrimination claim on the
grounds that Bechtel's affirmative evidence of its legitimate
reasons for discharging Guz shifted the burden to Guz to
"point[ ] to evidence which nonetheless raises a rational
inference that intentional discrimination occurred, 20' 6 and
that Guz failed to carry his respondent's burden." 7 The Court
held, "as a matter of law,... Guz failed to point to evidence
raising a triable issue that Bechtel's proffered reasons for its
08
actions were a pretext for prohibited age discrimination."
Justice Chin wrote a concurring opinion that presented
an additional basis for holding that Bechtel met its movant's
burden by showing that "Guz cannot state a prima facie age
discrimination case. 20 0
Justice Kennard dissented because she believed that Guz
satisfied his respondent's burden by submitting rebuttal
evidence that would have allowed a reasonable jury to
rationally infer that Bechtel's proferred reasons for
terminating his employment were a pretext for age
discrimination.210
Although he concurred with the majority, Justice Mosk
age
[of intentional
question
"the
that
conceded
discrimination] is close.'
Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
Marianne Saelzler was a Federal Express employee who
entered Sherwood Apartments, owned by the defendant, to
deliver a package to a resident.2 2 As she attempted to leave
the premises, three young men beat her and attempted to
rape her.2" 3 Prior to her attack, Ms. Saelzler saw two of the
2.

205. Id. at 1094.
206. Id. at 1115.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1124.
209. Id. at 1125 (Chin, J., concurring).
210. See id. at 1134 (Kennard. J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1124 (Mosk, J., concurring).
212. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1147 (Cal. 2001).
This second case in the trilogy was decided on May 31, 2001. Id. at 1143.
213. See id. at 1147.
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men loitering outside a locked gate that had been propped
open; she saw her third attacker already inside the
complex. 214 The property owner was aware of frequent and
recurring criminal activity inside the building complex, yet
did not provide any daytime security on the premises.2 15
Conceding that the defendant owed a duty to Ms. Saelzler to
provide reasonable daytime security measures and that the
defendant breached that duty, the Superior Court
nonetheless dismissed Ms. Saelzler's claim on summary
judgment on the grounds that she "failed to prove the breach
216
was a proximate cause of her assault."
Once again, a divided court of appeal reversed two to one,
holding that Ms. Saelzler's causation evidence did in fact
create an issue of fact for the jury. 17 As in Guz, the
California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal. 18
Justice Chin, writing this time for the majority, ruled that
the property owner had met its movant's burden to show Ms.
Saelzler "[had] not established, and cannot reasonably expect
to establish, a prima facie case of causation, a showing that
would forecast the inevitability of a nonsuit in defendants'
favor. 21 9
Because Ms. Saelzler could not identify her
attackers, the Court ruled that "her submission in opposition
to summary judgment lacked specific facts showing that
defendants' alleged negligence was an actual, legal cause of
her injuries" and, therefore, she failed to carry her
respondent's burden.2 °
Justices Werdergar and Kennard filed separate dissents.
Justice Kennard accused the majority of "bending both the
rules of summary judgment and the legal causation element

of negligence

,,,22'

depriving Ms. Saelzler of "her

214. See id.
215. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 105 (Ct. App.
1999) ("Upon reviewing the record we find the trial court accurately
summarized the situation at Sherwood Apartments when Saelzler's job required
her to enter the complex. 'Plaintiff has presented overwhelming evidence that
moving defendants had knowledge of frequent, recurring criminal activity on
the premises of their 28-building apartment complex.'").
216. Id. at 106.
217. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1148 (Cal. 2001).
218. Id. at 1155.
219. Id. at 1146.
220. Id. at 1147.
221. Id. at 1155 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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constitutional right to a trial by jury."22 2 Justice Werdergar
also accused the majority of misstating the summary
judgment burdens and "the requirements for proof of
causation," and concluded that, "[i]ndisputably, a reasonable
jury in this case could conclude, contrary to the majority, that
'roving guards would have encountered [plaintiffs] assailants
223
or prevented the attack.'
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Company
In 1991, the California Air Resources Board mandated
the sale of a cleaner burning gasoline known as CARB
gasoline. 2 4 The price of CARB gasoline "moved generally
upward across all of the petroleum companies more or less
225
Theresa
together, rising quickly and falling slowly."
defendant
the
against
Aguilar filed a class action complaint
oil companies, asserting that they entered into an unlawful
conspiracy to restrict the output of CARB gasoline in order to
Act, 2 7
raise its price,226 in violation of California's Cartwright
2 28
Act.
which is analogous to section 1 of the Sherman
The oil companies moved for summary judgment,
submitting affirmative evidence in the form of employee
affidavits which denied collusion. 22 9 The trial court initially
granted summary judgment to the oil companies but reversed
itself, believing it had applied the wrong summary judgment
standard in assessing whether defendants met their movant's
burden.2 ' The court of appeal reversed, ruling that the trial
court had misinterpreted case law by requiring the
defendants to submit affidavits from each of their employees
responsible for capacity, production and pricing decisions.3
The California Supreme Court affirmed the grant of
summary judgment, ruling that the evidentiary submission of
3.

222. Id. at 1157.
223. Id. at 1161-62 (Werdergar, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion,
23 P.3d at 1152) (second alteration in original).
224. See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 502 (Cal. 2001).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (1997) (original version at
ch. 530, § 1, Stat. 1907, 984-85 (1907)).
228. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980) (original version at Sherman Act ch. 647,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1909)).
229. See id. at 502-03.
230. See id. at 503-04.
231. Id. at 504-05.
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the oil companies satisfied their movant's burden. 32
Importing plaintiffs trial burden of persuasion into her
respondent's summary judgment burden, the Court further
ruled that Ms. Aguilar had not carried her respondent's
burden because her evidence did not show that an inference
of unlawful conspiracy was more likely than an inference of
permissible competition. 33 Instead, Ms. Aguilar's evidence
was considered to be equally consistent with both
inferences.2 4 Aguilar is the capstone opinion in the trilogy,
purporting to comprehensively and definitively state the
current law of summary judgment in California.
B.

The Movant's Burden: To Conclusively Negate, or Merely
Show the Absence of,Plaintiffs Case?
This section examines the impact of the trilogy of
decisions on the movant's burden on summary judgment and
concludes that, consistent with Union Bank, the judiciallycreated "conclusively negate" standard is no longer applicable
in determining the extent of the moving defendant's
burden." 5 This section also analyzes the degree to which the
trilogy has moved summary judgment jurisprudence beyond
the narrow holding of Union Bank toward adoption of the
federal standard.2 6

232. Id. at 521.
233. See id. "More likely than not" is a burden of persuasion standard that
governs the jury's decision when its mind is in equipoise. When the jury cannot
determine, based upon the evidence, whether to believe the plaintiffs case or
the defendant's case, it must find in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff
has failed to carry its burden of persuasion. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
234. See Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 515.
235. See Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
236. See supra Part I.C.

2002]

1.

519

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Guz v. Bechtel National,
DiscriminationClaim237
a.

Inc.:

The

Age

The Supreme Court's Guz Opinion Sidesteps the
Negate" vs. "Absence of Evidence"
"Conclusively
23

Issue

1

In Guz, the California Supreme Court's majority opinion
avoids the issue of whether a defendant can meet its movant's
burden of production by showing that the responding
plaintiffs case will be insufficient to meet his burden of
production at trial. Justice Chin's concurring opinion lays the
groundwork for the court's official abandonment, in Aguilar,
of the traditional summary judgment standard requiring the
moving defendant to "conclusively negate" an essential
element of the plaintiffs case. 9 Justice Chin's concurrence
in Guz then became a springboard for his majority opinion in
Saelzler, which was ultimately embraced by Justice Mosk's
majority opinion in Aguilar.24 °
The Court's opinion in Guz applies the traditional preUnion Bank requirement for satisfying the movant's burden
of production on summary judgment:
Under California's traditional rules, we determine with

respect to each cause of action whether the defendant
seeking summary judgment has conclusively negated a
necessary element of the plaintiffs case, or has
demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material

issue of fact that requires the process of trial, such that
the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.24 '
The summary judgment standard quoted above was
articulated by the California Supreme Court in its 1988

237. Although Guz asserted several causes of action, my analysis of the Guz

opinion addresses only the age discrimination claim because most of the
justices' meaningful discussion of summary judgment relates to that claim.
238. I use the phrase "absence of evidence" to mean insufficient evidence in
the plaintiffs case to create a triable issue, i.e. to satisfy plaintiffs burden of
production at trial.
239. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1125 (Cal. 2001) (Chin, J.,
concurring).
240. See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513 (Cal. 2001) ("In his
concurring opinion in Guz, Justice Chin anticipated the conclusion that we here
reach. We therefore embrace it fully." (citation omitted)).
241. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1099 (emphasis added).
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Molko predates the

1992-1993 amendments by four years and the Union Bank
decision by seven years. As authority for the continuing
validity of the Molko summary judgment standard, the Guz
opinion cites a string of California Supreme Court decisions,
each of which quotes the summary judgment standard
articulated in Molko.2 43 None of these decisions, which post-

date Union Bank, cites the Union Bank opinion as authority
on summary judgment. Thus, the high court in Guz continued
its practice of using the traditional summary judgment
terminology and continued to avoid ruling on the validity of
Union Bank's 1995 interpretation of the 1992-1993
amendments to the summary judgment statute.
The Guz Court was able to avoid the "absence of
evidence" issue because Bechtel sought to support its
movant's burden on two alternative grounds, one based on
showing an absence of evidence to support Guz's case, and the
other based on the traditional "conclusive negation" standard
in Molko.2 4 Opting to avoid the Celotex issue, the Court
decided that Bechtel met its movant's burden under
California's traditional standard.
Relying on the federal Celotex approach, under which
"the standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the
standard for a directed verdict," 45 Bechtel argued that Guz
bore an initial burden on summary judgment to present
admissible evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination at trial.146

Under the three-step

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test applicable in federal
courts, as well as in California courts, in trials alleging age
discrimination,2

47

Bechtel would not bear a burden at trial to

242. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 53 (Cal. 1998).
243. Id. More precisely, the language employed in these opinions, including
the language employed in Guz, misquotes Molko, which used the conjunctive,
not the disjunctive: "To succeed, the defendant must conclusively negate a
necessary element of the plaintiff's case, and demonstrate that under no
hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of a trial."
Id. (emphasis added).
244. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1112.
245. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
246. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1112.
247. Id. at 1113. Because of the similarity between California and federal
age discrimination statutes, "California has adopted the three-stage burdenshifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims
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produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory motive (the second
step) unless and until Guz first met his trial burden to
produce a prima facie case of age discrimination. Therefore,
Bechtel argued, it would have been able to move for a
directed verdict immediately after the close of Guz's prima
facie case and argue that Guz failed to state a case.248
Because Celotex held that a defendant should bear no greater
burden to support its summary judgment motion than it
would bear to support its directed verdict motion at trial,
Bechtel argued that it met its movant's burden on summary
judgment by showing that Guz could not demonstrate a
prima facie case of discrimination at trial.249
Relying on California's traditional summary judgment
standard,25 ° Guz contended that "he should have no [initial]
prima facie burden to avoid summary judgment."2 5' Under
that standard, Bechtel would have to present affirmative
a
that
showed
judgment
on
summary
evidence
not
Bechtel
would
even
though
nondiscriminatory motive
have carried that initialburden of production at trial.
When Guz reached the supreme court, California courts
of appeal were split over the manner in which the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting test should be applied to an
employer's motion for summary judgment in state
of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate
treatment." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court describes the three-step burdenshifting test as follows:
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), we set forth
the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a
Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment. First, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection." Third, should the defendant carry this burden,
the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons but were a pretext for
discrimination.
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (footnote
and citation omitted).
248. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1100 n.7.
249. Id. at 1112. "Bechtel contends that, in order to survive summary
judgment, Guz was obliged to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination,
but could not do so because it is undisputed that the bulk of his duties were
assumed by an older employee." Id.
250. See supra Part II.B.
251. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1115.
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employment discrimination cases. '52 Some appellate districts
following the Celotex approach 53 held that the summary
judgment burdens precisely match the trial burdens for
production laid down in McDonnell Douglas. 4 These courts,
according to Guz, "indicated that the plaintiff can survive an
employer's motion for summary judgment only by presenting,
at the outset, triable evidence satisfying the prima facie
255 Other courts of appeal,
elements of McDonnell Douglas."
following the traditional "negation" standard, held that the
McDonnell Douglas burdens were reversed from what they
would be at trial.5 6 These courts have held that "a plaintiff
opposing summary judgment need not demonstrate triable
issues until the moving defendant has made an initial nomerit 'show [ing]"'' 57 of non-discriminatory motive, thereby
reversing the McDonnell Douglas burdens of production.258
The supreme court declined the invitation of the
California Chamber of Commerce, as amicus curiae, to reach
the Celotex question as to whether "a moving defendant could
obtain summary judgment solely by showing, after
opportunity for discovery, that the opposing plaintiff had
failed to present triable evidence crucial to his case."255 The
high court also declined to resolve the split among the
California courts of appeal concerning the manner in which
summary judgment burdens of production operate in
California state law employment discrimination cases. 60
252. See id. at 1114-15.
253. See supra notes 92-111.
254. See supra note 247.
255. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1115.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 1114.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1100 n.7.
Bechtel and one of its amici curiae have questioned whether such
traditional standards apply to this case. Bechtel suggests that, to
survive summary judgment, Guz had the burden.., to establish,
under the generally accepted three-step procedure for testing such
claims, a prima facie case of intentional age discrimination. The
California Chamber of Commerce argues more broadly that the 1992
and 1993 amendments to the California summary judgment
statute adopted then extant federal standards, under which a moving
defendant could obtain summary judgment solely by showing, after
opportunity for discovery, that the opposing plaintiff had failed to
present triable evidence crucial to his case.
Id. (citations omitted).
260. See id. at 1115.
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Both issues were left unresolved, but were addressed in
Justice Chin's concurring opinion.261
The Court explained that Bechtel met its movant's
burden under California's traditional summary judgment
standard:
Bechtel did adduce, in support of its motion for summary
judgment, affirmative evidence which, unless materially
contradicted or rebutted, would establish that each of
Guz's causes of action lacked merit. By any interpretation
of the summary judgment statute, the burden thereupon
shifted to Guz to show the existence of one or more triable
issues of material fact ....
The Court then ruled that the summary judgment burden of
production shifted to Guz:
Thus, even if Guz had no initial burden to demonstrate a
prima facie case of discrimination - a question we do not
decide - Guz did have a burden, in the face of Bechtel's
showing of nondiscriminatory reasons, to show there was
nonetheless a triable issue that decisions leading to Guz's
termination were actually made on the prohibited basis of
his age. 263

b.

Dismissal of Guz's Age DiscriminationClaim: A
Relaxed Application of the "Conclusively Negate"
Standard

to
show
burden
its
movant's
support
To
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Guz, Bechtel
largely relied on the depositions of its own employees.26 4 This
deposition testimony established that Bechtel eliminated
Guz's work unit, including his position, as part of a work
force reduction to consolidate costs.265 Second, the deposition
testimony established that the younger employees, chosen to
fill the vacant positions in the new unit, were more qualified
than Guz for the available position.26 6 The supreme court
majority found that the testimony of these employees, Bechtel
executives and managers, constituted a "creditable and

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See id. at 1125.
Id. at 1100 n.7 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1117 (first emphasis added).
See id. at 1116-17.
See id.
See id.
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sufficient showing of innocent motive,, 267 a "facially
dispositive showing," 26 8 that shifted the burden of production
to Guz to respond "by pointing to evidence which nonetheless
raises a rational inference that intentional discrimination
occurred." 6 '
Rejecting Guz's rebuttal evidence aimed at
showing Bechtel's proffered reasons were false and
concluding that "Guz made major concessions to both the
plausibility and truthfulness of Bechtel's proffered reasons,"27 °
the Court reversed the court of appeal and affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to Bechtel.27 '
There is a serious question whether Bechtel's evidentiary
showing of legitimate reasons for terminating Guz
conclusively negated the element of age discrimination as a
substantial factor in Guz's termination. Guz's case turned on
the critical issue of Bechtel's reason for terminating his
employment (cost reduction or "age-related animus").272 To
show Bechtel's nondiscriminatory motivation, Bechtel offered
the deposition testimony of its own employees, high-ranking
executives who played major roles in Guz's termination.2 73
Such testimony by interested witnesses raises significant
issues of credibility and bias. Courts have urged caution in
granting summary judgment to employers in discrimination
cases where intent is an issue.274 Caution is especially
warranted where the employer's own employees are the sole
source of proof of its nondiscriminatory intent.
267. Id. at 1118. Bechtel asserted the reasons for the termination: (1) a
"downturn in workload" and to consolidate costs; (2) Guz's tasks were then
assumed by existing workers at the new unit; and (3) the younger employees
chosen to fill the positions at the new unit were better qualified for those
particular positions than Guz. Id. at 1130.
268. Id. at 1115.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1120 ("Essentially uncontradicted are Bechtel's showings (1) that
Guz himself proposed Shaeffer as the logical choice to assume Guz's overhead
duties, (2) that Tevis had non-age-related business reasons for hiring Wraith,
Siu, Wallace, Vreim, and Stenho, and (3) that those persons were well qualified
for their positions."). Justice Kennard's dissent argues that Guz presented
sufficient evidence establishing a prima facie case and "evidence from which a
rational factfinder could conclude that the employer's proffered explanation for
its actions was false." Id. at 1133. See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 154 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
271. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1124.
272. Id. at 1112.
273. Id. at 1116-17.
274. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 117, § 6.12, at 98.
275. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(e) (2002). The California summary
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While the testimony of Bechtel's employees may be
credible and sufficient to satisfy Bechtel's trial burden of
production under McDonnell Douglas for the purpose of
avoiding a directed verdict against Bechtel, it is questionable
whether that testimony conclusively negates the material fact
of discriminatory intent sufficient to shift the burden of
production to Guz on summary judgment. The Court's
determination that Bechtel met its movant's burden on
discriminatory intent might have been justified if the court
had been applying the Celotex standard under which
summary judgment burdens mirror directed verdict
burdens.2 76 Bechtel's showing would have been sufficient to
meet its burden of production at trial to provide sufficient
evidence on which a jury could reasonably find Bechtel
terminated Guz for legitimate reasons and to shift the burden
At trial,
back to Guz to provide evidence of pretext. 277
Bechtel's case would not have to be conclusive to shift the
burden to Guz to show Bechtel's proffered legitimate reasons
were a pretext for age discrimination. The Guz Court,
however, purported to be applying California's traditional

judgment statute recognizes the danger of precluding a trial when an
individual's state of mind is a material fact and the sole source of proof of that
individual's state of mind is the individual's own testimony. See id. Although
section 437c(e) applies to witness affidavits and declarations, the underlying
principle concerning the credibility of a witness whose intent is a material fact
appears applicable to a witness's deposition testimony. Compare federal
summary judgment practice. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2739, at 396
("[When motive, intent, or subjective feelings and reactions are in issue,
summary judgment may be denied despite the opposing party's noncompliance
with Rule 56(e)."). But another view is that
Rule 56 is silent on the admissibility of affidavits of interested parties.
Nonetheless, some commentators have expressed concern about relying
on the affidavits of interested parties in support of a summary
judgment motion ....The common thread among those commentators
who have expressed skepticism toward the input of interested parties
into the summary judgment process is recognition of the need for the
trier of fact to assess questions of credibility relevant to controverted
issues ....It would be unwise to establish a rigid rule against the use
of interested party or witness affidavits in support of a summary
[Wihere there exists no specific basis on which
judgment motion ....
to question an affiant's testimony other than his interest in the case,
most courts today will find summary judgment to be appropriate.
BRUNET ET AL., supra note 117, § 8.10, at 193-96. For a discussion of credibility
as a triable issue, see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
276. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
277. See supra note 247.
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standard,278 not the federal standard articulated in Celotex.279
Having concluded that Bechtel's "facially dispositive"
evidence of nondiscriminatory motive shifted the summary
judgment burden of production to Guz,28° the majority ruled
that Guz failed to meet its respondent's burden to rebut
Bechtel's evidence. The majority determined that Guz's
evidence failed to contradict Bechtel's proferred reasons for
firing Guz and "essentially conceded that the reasons cited by
Bechtel in support of its motion for summary judgment - cost
efficiency and concerns about BNI-MI's performance as a unit
- were the true reasons why Bechtel decided to eliminate
BNI-MI." Justice Kennard's dissent argues at length that
Guz did present evidence from which a rational fact finder
could conclude that Bechtel's proffered explanation was false
and that Guz281 was "the victim of intentional age
discrimination."

Therefore, although the Court chose to anchor its holding
in Guz on California's traditional conclusive negation
summary judgment standard, it appears to have relaxed the
application of that standard. As demonstrated in the next
section,282 the concurring opinion of Justice Chin laid the
groundwork for the Court's subsequent rejection of the
conclusive negation requirement of Barnes and Molko, and
278. See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text.
280. The Court explained,
Bechtel's explanation of nondiscriminatory reasons was creditable on
its face. Indeed, . . . Guz has largely conceded the truth, if not the
wisdom, of Bechtel's proferred reasons. Guz thus had the burden to
rebut this facially dispositive showing by pointing to evidence which
nonetheless raises a rational inference that intentional discrimination
occurred.... Guz has failed to do so.
Guz, 8 P.3d at 1115.
281. Justice Kennard stated,
Because, as I have explained, Guz's evidence was sufficient.., not only
for a jury to reject Bechtel's proffered reasons for the discharge but also
for an appellate court to uphold an age discrimination verdict, that
evidence squarely presented "the ultimate question" in any disparate
treatment case, namely, "whether the plaintiff was the victim of
intentional discrimination." That issue was in this case a material
issue of fact in dispute. Therefore, the trial court erred when, in
granting summary judgment for Bechtel, it precluded Guz from having
the merits of this material issue of fact resolved at trial.
Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1132 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See infra
Parts III.C-III.C.1 (concerning Respondent Guz's burden).
282. See infra notes 283-311.
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the Court's movement toward the federal summary judgment
model in Saelzler and Aguilar.
Justice Chin's ConcurringOpinion: Groundwork
for the Leap Toward the Federal Standard in
Aguilar
The greatest significance of the Guz opinion for
understanding the current state of California summary
judgment law lays in Justice Chin's concurrence, which
directly addressed the "prima facie burden" issue that the
majority opinion sidestepped. The concurrence, which was
83
fully embraced by Justice Mosk in Aguilar, laid the
foundation for overturning the traditional view of summary
285
judgment as articulated in Barnes284 and Molko.
The court in Guz held that Bechtel met its movant's
burden by submitting affirmative evidence establishing a
nondiscriminatory motive for Guz's termination (the second
step in the McDonnell Douglas three-step burden-shifting
trial scenario),286 satisfying Bechtel's movant's burden and
shifting the burden to Guz to demonstrate that Bechtel's
proffered legitimate reason was a mere pretext for age
discrimination. 8 ' The Court affirmed the trial court's award
of summary judgment to Bechtel, ruling that "as a matter of
law,... Guz... failed to point to evidence raising a triable
issue that Bechtel's proffered reasons for its actions were a
pretext for prohibited age discrimination."28 8 The Court did
not sustain the trial court's summary judgment order on the
alternative ground that Guz had failed to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination (the first step of the three89
The
step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis).
Court also did not rule that Guz failed to demonstrate a
prima facie case, 9 ' but rather held that "Guz's evidence
c.

283. See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 520 (Cal. 2001).
284. Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1969).
285. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988).
286. See supra note 247. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
287. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
288. Id. at 1124.
289. See supra note 247.
290. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1122 ("[E]ven if barely adequate to demonstrate a
prima facie case, [Guz's comparative-age evidence] is insufficient for trial in the
face of Bechtel's strong contrary showing that its reasons were unrelated to age-
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raised, at best, only a weak suspicion that discrimination was
a likely basis for his release. Against that evidence, Bechtel
has presented a plausible, and largely uncontradicted,
explanation that it eliminated BNI-MI, and chose others over
Guz, for reasons unrelated to age."291
Justice Chin directly addressed Bechtel's first argument
that Guz had an initial burden to demonstrate a prima facie
case of age discrimination 92 (the first step of the three-step
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis). 93 He stated
that Guz had failed to meet that burden.294 As an additional
ground for supporting the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, Justice Chin agreed with Bechtel, stating that
"Bechtel, the moving party on summary judgment, has met
its burden of showing that Guz cannot state a prima facie age
discrimination case. Accordingly, Bechtel had no duty even
to rebut Guz's 29'age discrimination claim, although I agree that
it also did so. 5
Justice Chin would have brought California summary
judgment jurisprudence even closer to the federal model
under Celotex 9' than did the court of appeal's opinion in
Union Bank.2 9
The Union Bank decision held that, where plaintiffs
interrogatory responses show that the plaintiff essentially
has "no case," those responses satisfy the movant's burden to
"show[ I that one or more elements of the cause of action...
cannot be established."29 Union Bank did not speak to the
situation in which the plaintiff has a case but the defendant
argues that the plaintiffs case is legally insufficient to create
an issue for the jury, i.e., to avoid a directed verdict at trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court's summary judgment trilogy did
speak to this issue, essentially allowing a defendant to satisfy
its movant's burden by "showing" or "pointing out" that the
related bias.").
291. Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).
292. See id. at 1115 ("Bechtel urges we adopt the latter view and impose an
initial prima facie burden on a plaintiff opposing an employer's motion for
summary judgment. Here, Bechtel insists, Guz could not demonstrate a prima
facie case ....
").
293. See supra note 247.
294. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1125-26.
295. Id. at 1125.
296. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
297. Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
298. See id. at 654 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437(o)(2) (2002)).
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plaintiffs case is insufficient to survive a directed verdict
motion at trial.299 The federal trilogy eliminated the preexisting distinction in standards between pre-trial and trial
motions that address the legal sufficiency-of-the-evidence,
and applied the same standard to define the movant's burden
for each of these sufficiency-of-the-evidence motions, whether
made before or during trial. 00
Guz was not a "no evidence" case. Guz offered evidence
on summary judgment which, he argued, made out a prima
facie case of age discrimination.301 Bechtel argued that Guz's
evidence was legally insufficient to satisfy his trial burden of
production to make out a prima facie case of age
discrimination, required by the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting formula.0 2 Justice Kennard, in a
vigorous dissent in Guz, disagreed with Justice Chin's
30 3
conclusion that "Guz cannot state a prima facie case." Even
the majority opinion did not rest on the grounds that Guz's
evidence, directed at establishing a prima facie case, could
not withstand a directed verdict motion.
Justice Chin's concurring opinion reached beyond the
holding of Union Bank and constituted another step in the
direction of the federal summary judgment model under
Celotex. Justice Chin asserted the proposition, not expressed
in Union Bank, that California summary judgment law after
the 1992-1993 statutory amendments allows a defendant to
meet its movant's burden by challenging the sufficiency of the
299. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
300. The Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., explained that
[The] "genuine issue" summary judgment standard is "very close" to
the "reasonable jury" directed verdict standard: "The primary
difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment
motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary
evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided
on the evidence that has been admitted."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (quoting Bill
Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.ll (1983)).
301. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1115 (Cal. 2000) ("However, Guz
asserts, if he did have an initial burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of age
discrimination to avoid summary judgment, he satisfied it by pointing to
evidence that, when implementing its work force reduction, Bechtel treated
younger employees more favorably than older.").
302. Id. ("Here, Bechtel insists, Guz could not demonstrate a prima facie
case because the transfer of Guz's specific BNI-MI duties to an older worker,
Shaeffer, negated an inference of anti-age animus as a matter of law.").
303. Id. at 1134 n.4 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs case just as it would at trial through a directed
verdict motion. In Guz, Justice Chin extended the rationales
of the Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. and Hagen v.
Hichenbottom °4 decisions made in different appellate districts
of the Court of Appeal of California where the movant argued
the plaintiff had no case based on plaintiffs factually devoid
discovery responses:
To prevail on summary judgment in a discrimination case,
the defendant must show that the plaintiff both has not
established and cannot reasonably expect to establish a
prima facie case. A defendant can meet the former burden
merely by showing the absence of evidence of
discrimination. But that is not enough. The defendant
must also show by direct or circumstantial evidence that
the plaintiff cannot reasonably expect to obtain a prima
facie case. This latter showing, however, is not impossibly
difficult. If a plaintiff has had the full opportunity to
obtain discovery and to present all available evidence in
support of a discrimination claim, and still has failed to
establish a prima facie case, the trial court may
reasonably infer that the plaintiff cannot do so. If the
plaintiff cannot present a prima facie case, a nonsuit at
trial would be inevitable. °5
In both Scheiding and Hagen, the "circumstantial
evidence" that the defendant offered to support an inference
of an absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs case
consisted of factually devoid discovery responses. °6 Hagen
and Scheiding agreed with Union Bank in acknowledging
that some factually devoid discovery responses could support
an inference of an absence of evidence, but these opinions also
emphasized that not all factually devoid responses will suffice

304. Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360 (Ct. App. 1999);
Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Ct. App. 1995). Justice Chin
finds these two cases to strike the right balance between the divergent
approaches found in various Court of Appeal of California decisions. See Guz, 8
P.3d at 1125-26 (Chin, J., concurring). For example, some courts simply
required a defendant to "point to the plaintiffs lack of evidence," whereas others
required the defendant to submit affirmative evidence to show plaintiffs
inability to prove its case. See id.
305. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1126 (Chin, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
306. See generally Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 372 ("We agree with

Hunter that the circumstantialevidence which would be required by Hagen can
consist of 'factually devoid' discovery responses from which an absence of
evidence can be inferred."); Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197.
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to show that the case cannot be established." 7 Scheiding
cautioned that "the burden should not shift without stringent
review of the direct, circumstantial and inferential
evidence."" 8 Both Hagen and Scheiding noted that a moving
defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff by merely
arguing the absence of evidence to the court.0 9 Justice Chin's
concurrence extended this inferential reasoning beyond the
limits of devoid discovery responses, allowing defendants to
argue that plaintiffs case is legally insufficient to support a
reasoned jury verdict.310 This concept of the movant's burden
is virtually indistinguishable from the federal standard under
the Celotex trilogy, which allows the defendant to point to an
in the record of evidence to support the plaintiffs
absence
311
case.

This expansive, federalized view of summary judgment
opened up the possibility that California summary judgment,
like its federal counterpart, could be used to evaluate the
strength of a plaintiffs case, moving the court close to the
judge-jury boundary line. The next two decisions in the
California trilogy, Saelzler and Aguilar, make that possibility
a reality.
2.

Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400

A Reversal of Course: The Court Finally Falls
in Line Behind Union Bank
In Saelzler, the dispute between plaintiff and defendant
turned on the issue of the movant's burden. 12 Unlike Guz,
where Bechtel submitted affirmative evidence in the form of
affidavits to support its movant's burden under the
a.

307. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208. The Scheiding court rejected the
moving defendant's reliance on plaintiffs discovery responses, stating, "The
deposition [of plaintiff Dinwiddie] and standard interrogatories [served on
Dinwiddiel in this case did not contain questions aimed specifically at the
presence or absence of Dinwiddie at jobsites, and neither of these discovery
devices was comparable to an 'all facts' interrogatory on the subject."
Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
308. Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
309. See Hagen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207; Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
310. See, e.g., Gu, 8 P.3d at 1126, 1129 ("Guz's inability to present any
credible evidence to establish his age discrimination claim supports the superior
court's grant of summary judgment in Bechtel's favor.").
311. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
312. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Cal. 2001).
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traditional standard, the defendant in Saelzler merely
pointed to an absence of evidence in the record to support
plaintiffs case on proximate cause, specifically, her inability
to identify her assailant."3
In reversing the trial court's award of summary
judgment to the landlord, the court of appeal applied the
traditional "conclusive negation" standard:
Before a defendant is allowed summary judgment the
evidence should conclusively establish the general causal
connection between absence of security and criminal
activity does not apply in this case by showing this
particular criminal would have committed this crime
against this victim despite the presence of reasonable
security measures.314
Therefore, the moving defendant could win a reversal in the
supreme court only if the court overturned the traditional
requirement of "proving the negative" and allowed the
landlord to show that Saelzler did not have enough evidence
to go to trial.
The supreme court in Saelzler squarely addressed the
question of the continuing vitality of the traditional summary
judgment rule that the moving defendant must conclusively
negate the plaintiffs case.315 Justice Chin wrote the court's
opinion in Saelzler. Building upon the foundation he laid
seven months earlier in his Guz concurrence, Justice Chin
made clear that the traditional requirement that a moving
defendant conclusively negate the opposing party's case is no
longer the applicable summary judgment standard in
California.316 The California Supreme Court adopted the
following interpretation:
Under the current version of the summary judgment
statute, a moving defendant need not support his motion
with affirmative evidence negating an essential element of
313. Id. at 1155.
314. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 106, 112 (Ct. App.
1999).
315. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
316. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1154 (rejecting the court of appeal's holding that
"defendants' flagrant failure to provide daytime security justified shifting the
burden of proof to defendants to conclusively establish the absence of a causal
relation between its breach of duty and the assault on plaintiff, by showing this
particular assault would have occurred even if reasonable security measures
had been taken.").
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the responding party's case.

Instead, the moving

defendant may ... point to the absence of evidence to

support the plaintiffs case. When that is done, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to present317evidence showing there is
fact.
a triable issue of material
This standard represents a reversal of course for the
California Supreme Court. In Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd.,
decided two years prior to Saelzler and four years after Union
Bank, the high court applied the traditional movant's burden
standard requiring defendant to "conclusively negate[ I a
necessary element of the plaintiffs case or demonstrate[ I
that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that
requires the process of trial."318 One month after Saelzler,
Justice Mosk would expressly repudiate the language from
9
Sharon P. in his opinion in Aguilar."
The Court Extends the Narrow Holding offUnion
Bank: "PointingTo" the Absence of Evidence
Saelzler represents a major extension of the narrow
°
Union Bank repudiated the
holding in Union Bank.32
requirement that defendant "prove the
traditional
3"2'
The court in Union Bank, however, had
negative."
22 to sanction the use of
narrowly confined its holding
b.

317. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1155 (quoting Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 785, 791 (Ct. App. 1996)). Note however, summary judgment law in
California continues to require a defendant moving for summary judgment to
present evidence, and not simply point out through argument, that the plaintiff
does not posses, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. See Aguilar v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513 (Cal. 2001); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b)
(Deering 2002).
318. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 125 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Ann M.
v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 211 (Cal. 1993)).
319. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 513 n.19 ("[Lianguage in certain decisions
purportedly requiring a defendant moving for summary judgment to
conclusively negate an element of plaintiffs cause of action derives from
summary judgment law as it stood prior to the 1992 and 1993 amendments,
does not reflect such law as it stands now, and is accordingly disapproved."
(citation omitted)).
320. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
321. Union Bank v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 658 (Ct. App. 1995)
("However, the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c have legislatively
overruled the prior decision of this court in Barnes."). See also Scheiding v.
Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365-67 (Ct. App. 1999).
322. The court stated,
[Tihe only issue raised by this petition relates to whether Barnes v.
Blue Haven Pools required that the summary judgment motion at issue
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factually devoid interrogatories to show that an element of
the plaintiffs case "cannot be established."3 23 The moving
defendant in Saelzler did not support its motion with
factually devoid discovery responses but, rather, pointed to
Saelzler's inability to identify her attackers and, on that
basis, argued Saelzler could not meet her trial burden of
production for causation.3 24 The supreme court's opinion in
Saelzler extended Union Bank's holding by stating that "the
moving defendant may... point to the absence of evidence to
support the plaintiffs case."325
As he did in his concurring opinion in Guz, Justice Chin
relied heavily on Scheiding.326 Scheiding, however, held only
that a moving defendant who cannot negate an element of
plaintiffs case can, nevertheless, rely on "factually devoid
discovery responses" as circumstantial evidence "from which
an absence of evidence can be inferred."3 27 Justice Chin's
opinion also extends Scheiding beyond the narrow confines of
factually devoid discovery responses.
By allowing the moving defendant to "pointto the absence
of evidence to support the plaintiffs case," Saelzler moved
California summary judgment to the brink of the federal
Celotex model. Celotex permits the defendant to discharge its
burden by "'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district
court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the
be denied. Our opinion can only be read to apply to the specific issue
before the court ....

We are not addressing other issues concerning

the manner rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may apply
to California summary judgment motions or the further applicability of
Celotex Corp. v. Catrettto section 437c as amended in 1992 and 1993.
Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665 (citations omitted); Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 365-66.
323. "Taken together, the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c
legislatively overruled this division's holding in Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools,
insofar as it prohibited a summary judgment motion from being granted when a
moving defendant merely relies on a plaintiffs factually devoid interrogatory
answers." Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (quoting CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 437c(o) (Deering 2002)).
324. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1151-52 (Cal. 2001).
325. Id. at 1155 (quoting Leslie G. v. Perry Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 785, 791
(Ct. App. 1996)). The full quote from Leslie G. states: "Instead, the moving
defendant may (through factually vague discovery responses or otherwise) point
to the absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs case." The words "through
factually vague discovery responses or otherwise" were curiously omitted from
the quotation used in the Saelzler opinion.
326. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1146.
327. Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
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1,328

nonmoving party's case ....

The Court's Application of the "Pointing To"
Standard to the Facts in Saelzler: Which Party
Bears the Burden to Identify Saelzler's
Assailant?
Saelzler is not a case where the plaintiff presented no
evidence on a material issue."' Rather, a majority of the
California Supreme Court justices held that Saelzler's case on
causation was insufficient to support a rational inference that
c.

328. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
329. Saelzler's analysis of the plaintiffs case is reminiscent of the U.S.
Supreme Court's assessment of the plaintiffs case in Celotex. In both opinions,
the respective supreme courts found that the moving defendant successfully
shouldered its movant's burden by showing an absence of evidence to support
proximate cause. In Celotex, the defendant relied upon the plaintiffs factually
devoid interrogatories to establish that Mrs. Catrett could offer at trial no
witness to establish her deceased husband's exposure to its brand of asbestos.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320. Therefore, Mrs. Catrett could not establish causation.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court emphasized that Saelzler could not
identify her attackers and, therefore, she could not prove proximate cause.
Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1151-52. However, unlike Mrs. Catrett, Saelzler did
present evidence of causation. Id. at 1163-64 (Werdergar, J., dissenting). The
issue that divided judges from the trial court to the California Supreme Court
was whether Saelzler's evidence was sufficient to support a reasonableinference
of causation. Compare id. at 1155 ("The evidence at hand, however, merely
shows the speculative possibility that additional daytime security guards and/or
functioning security gates might have prevented the assault."), with id. at 1157
(Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Here, plaintiff offered evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find that defendants' failure to maintain their
property in a safe condition was more than a minimal cause of plaintiffs
assault.") and id. at 1163 (Werdergar, J., dissenting) ("In sum, plaintiff
submitted sufficient evidence... to permit a rational jury to find that
defendants' omissions were a substantial factor in causing her injuries."). The
court of appeal's opinion, and the dissenting opinions of Justices Kennard and
Werdergar, argue that Saelzler did not bear the burden to identify her
assailants because she did not have to identify her assailants to make out a
legally sufficient case on proximate cause. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400,
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 112 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Having created this situation, it
should not be the crime victim's responsibility to prove the behavior of her
unknown assailants followed the general pattern - commit crimes where and
when the risk of detection is minimal or better yet non-existent and avoid
committing them where the risks are significant."); Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1156
(Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Thus, under well-established law plaintiff here need
not prove with certainty that the presence of security guards would have
prevented the sexual assault."); Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1161 (Werdergar, J.,
dissenting) ("Moreover, in requiring plaintiff to 'prove [her assailants] would not
have succeeded in assaulting her if defendants had provided additional security
precautions,' the majority both misstates the applicable proof burden and places
it on the wrong party." (citation omitted)).
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the complete absence of security measures in the building
complex was a substantial factor in causing the criminal
attack on Ms. Saelzler.33 °
The majority placed the burden on Ms. Saelzler to
identify her assailant.33 ' They concluded that her inability to
do so precluded the jury from rationally inferring that her
particularassailant would have been deterred by reasonable
security measures in the building." The dissenting justices
disagreed, arguing that Saelzler had presented sufficient
evidence to support an inference that reasonable security
measures would likely have deterred her assailant from
attacking her.333
The building owners did not dispute that they owed a
duty to Ms. Saelzler to provide reasonable security on the
premises and that they breached that duty by failing to
provide daytime security personnel.334 Indeed, the trial court
found "overwhelming evidence of prior incidents of trespass
and broken or inoperable perimeter fences or gates, and a
'long list' of criminal activity on the premises, including a
juvenile gang possibly 'headquartered there."'3 5 The trial
court concluded that there existed triable issues of duty and
breach:
Given the "high foreseeability" that violent crime would
occur on their premises, moving defendants had a duty to
provide security and to diligently repair security devices
on the premises such as the locks on their gates ....
Moving defendants, however, have provided no evidence
about their security precautions. And Plaintiffs have
provided evidence that the only precautions moving
defendants have taken was in hiring security guards to
patrol at night. Thus, clearly an issue of fact exists as to
whether moving defendants breached their duty to
provide reasonable safety precautions to check [the]
rampant violence.336

330. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1143. Justices Kennard, Werdergar, and Mosk
dissented. See id. at 1155, 1157.
331. See id. at 1151-52.
332. See id. at 1155.
333. See id. at 1155-64.
334. See id. at 1148.
335. Id.
336. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 105 (Ct.
App.1999) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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Nevertheless, defendants successfully argued in the trial
court and the supreme court that Ms. Saelzler could not prove
causation because she could not identify her assailants. 7
The majority agreed with the property owners that, had the
assailant been a tenant in the complex, the owner's failure to
repair broken locks on several gates to the complex could not
have caused the assault because he would have gained entry
with his key. 38 Even if the perpetrator had not been a
tenant, he could have entered the complex by following a
tenant through the gate.339 The majority further observed
that "plaintiff cannot show that roving guards would have
encountered her assailants or prevented the attack. ''34" The
court concluded that Ms. Saelzler was "unable to prove [that]
it was 'more probable than not' that additional security
precautions would have prevented the attack."34 '
The court of appeal majority and the dissenting
California Supreme Court justices argued that the plaintiffs
evidence of high foreseeability that violent crime would occur
on defendant's premises, coupled with the complete absence
of daytime security measures, was sufficient to support a
rational inference by a jury that reasonable security
measures would have deterred Ms. Saelzler's attackers.342
Justice Werdergar charges,
[T]he majority flatly misstates the requirements for proof
of causation. California's substantial factor [causation]
standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the
contribution of the individual cause be more than
negligible or theoretical. The majority misunderstands
the substantial factor test, improperly suggesting it
burdens plaintiff with proving it more probable than
not... that defendants' carelessness caused her
injuries.343
The court of appeal majority and the dissenting supreme
court justices in Saelzler were troubled by the potential for
337. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147.
338. Id. at 1151.
339. Id. at 1149.
340. Id. at 1152.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1163.
343. Id. at 1161 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Even at
trial, a plaintiff need not establish causation with certainty . . . a certain
element of guesswork is always involved." Id. at 1156.

538

[Vol. 42

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

abuse posed by the newly invigorated summary judgment
procedure.3 44 These judges expressed grave concern that the
dismissal of Ms. Saelzler's claim on summary judgment
deprived her of her right to a jury trial345 and crossed the line
that divides the functions of judge and jury by converting
questions of fact into questions of law.346 Justice Werdergar
emphasized that the majority also slipped across the law-fact
divide by confusing the issue of a landlord's duty, a policyladen question of law for judges to resolve, from factual
questions of causation which fall peculiarly within the
province of the jury to apply its common sense and ordinary
347
experience.
Saelzler also raises questions about the extent to which
the moving defendant's burden has been relaxed under the
liberal summary judgment standard announced by Justice
Chin. The dissenting justices criticized the majority for
shifting the burden of identifying Ms. Saelzler's assailants
from the moving defendant to Ms. Saelzler, requiring her to
establish causation with certainty.4 8 The court of appeal's
opinion articulates this position best:
344. See id. at 1155-57 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Only by bending both the
rules of summary judgment and the legal causation element of negligence can
the majority reach its result."). Id. at 1155.
345. See id. at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("The majority's errors deprive
plaintiff of her constitutional right to a trial by jury. A judge ruling on a motion
for summary judgment is not sitting as a trier of fact. When, as here, the
plaintiff has a triable issue of material fact it is the jury that must decide the
issue.").
346. Justice Werdergar in her dissent stated,
Like other fact questions, that of causation indisputably is entrusted to
the "common sense which we have traditionally attributed to that
body." O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club [cite omitted] In the past, we
have

found "no reason to

assume that a . . . common

sense

determination of ... [causal] responsibility will be beyond the ken of..
. juries" Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, and the majority provides
no reason to assume so here.
Id. at 1161-62 (Werdergar, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
347. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1158 (Werdergar, J., dissenting). Justice
Werdergar stated that the "question of causation long has been recognized as a
factual one, and it is only where reasonable men and women will not dispute
the absence of causality that it becomes a question of law .

. . ."

Id. (internal

quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). She elaborated that "[piroof
of the relation of cause and effect can never be more than the projection of our
habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain antecedents merely
because we have observed those sequences on previous occasions. .

.

. Such

questions are peculiarly for the jury." Id. at 1160 (quotation marks omitted).
348. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1156-60.
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Having created this [criminal] environment into which
Ms. Saelzler innocently entered, it should not be the crime
victim's responsibility to prove the behavior of her
unknown assailants followed the general pattern commit crimes where and when the risk of detection is
minimal or better yet non-existent and avoid committing
them where the risks are significant. Instead proof of
causation is lacking only when the evidence shows this
particular crime was an exception - it would have
happened even had the owner satisfied the standard of
care by providing a reasonable level of security
precautions. 49

Under this line of reasoning, the defendant should have borne
the burden of conclusively establishing that "the general
causal connection between absence of security and criminal
activity does not apply in this case by showing this particular
criminal would have committed this crime against this victim
despite the presence of reasonable security measures."35 °
Arguably, had the Saelzler majority applied the traditional
California summary judgment standard, utilized by the court
of appeal, the landlord would have borne the burden to
conclusively negate causality.35 ' Instead, the court reversed
the traditional standard by requiring Ms. Saelzler to
conclusively establish causality, a burden she would not have
borne even at trial.3
Underlying the differences between the judges and
justices in Saelzler are divergent views on substantive policy
questions pertaining to tort law liability of landlords for
crimes committed on their property.3 However, the Saelzler
349. Saelzler, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
350. Id.
351. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1154. Justice Chin criticized the "burdenshifting approach" taken in the lower appellate court for being "directly
contrary to the state's summary judgment statute, which provides that a
defendant meets its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit 'if
that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action...
" Id.
cannot be established ....
352. Cf id. at 1155. See also id. at 1156 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("In
essence, the majority imposes on plaintiff the burden of showing causation with
certainty. This is wrong.").
353. See id. at 1145. Justice Chin opened his majority opinion by focusing
not on summary judgment, but on the need to consider the substantive question
of "the liability of apartment owners ... to persons injured on their premises by
the criminal acts of others" and to "balance ...competing policy concerns." Id.
By contrast, Justice Werdergar opened her dissenting opinion by asserting that
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opinion highlights a difficult question about the extent to
which, if at all, the more liberal summary judgment standard
announced in that decision, in the future, will provide
leverage for judges to divert cases from the jury that they
disfavor on substantive grounds.
As postscript to this analysis of the movant's burden in
Saelzler, it is interesting to note that Justice Mosk, known as
a liberal on social policy issues, joined Justice Werdergar's
dissent in opposing the dismissal of plaintiffs claim on
summary judgment, apparently on substantive tort law
grounds.35 4 One month after Saelzler was decided, Justice
Mosk authored the court's opinion in Aguilar that placed a
powerful summary judgment procedure in the hands of
defendants. 5' Ironically, Justice Mosk's opinion in Aguilar
frustrated efforts by liberals in the legislature to launch a
counterrevolution in summary judgment by restoring the
traditional California approach.5
3.

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

The capstone of the California Supreme Court's trilogy is
Justice Stanley Mosk's opinion in Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., in which he definitively sets forth "the law that
courts must apply in ruling on motions for summary
'
judgment in all actions."357
Aguilar brought a class action on behalf of herself and all
other retail consumers of CARB gasoline alleging that nine
major oil companies "had entered into an unlawful conspiracy
to restrict the output of CARB gasoline and to raise its
price." 35" The oil companies moved for summary judgment,
Justice Chin confused the "policy-laden questions about the existence .. .of a
landlord's duty to maintain reasonably safe premises" with the factual issue of
causation. Id. at 1157. Justice Werdergar went on to suggest that the court
used the causation issue to "further... insulate even the most careless
[landlords] from their minimal responsibilities.... ." Id. at 1158.
354. Id. at 1164.
355. Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493 (Cal. 2001).
356. See Dan Walters, Justice Mosk's Last Decision CreatesPoliticalProblem
for Democrats, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 6, 2001, at A3.
357. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 501 ("We granted review in this cause to clarify the
law that courts must apply in ruling on motions for summary judgment, both in
actions generally and specifically in antitrust actions for unlawful conspiracy.").
358. Id. at 502. This private class action was backed by State Attorney
General Bill Lockyer. See Walters, supra note 356, at A3. The subject of the
suit was politically charged.
Democrats, led by Gov. Gray Davis and Lockyer, have accused
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submitting "declarations by officers or managers or similar
employees with responsibility in the premises, generally
stating on personal knowledge how the company made its
capacity, production, and pricing decisions about CARB
gasoline, asserting that it did so independently, and denying
In
that it did so collusively with any of the others.""'
response, Aguilar
presented evidence including the companies' gathering
and dissemination of capacity, production, and pricing
information, through the independently owned and
operated Oil Price Information Service . . . ; their use of
common consultants; and . . . execution of exchange

agreements - under which.., two companies may
trade... products of the same type in different
geographical areas and/or at different times or products of
different types in the same geographical area and/or at
the same time - including any consequent activity, or lack
of activity, in the spot market, where individual wholesale
She also
bulk sales and purchases are transacted.
60
presented ... evidence in the form of opinion by experts.

Initially, the trial court granted defendants' summary
judgment motion, finding that the declarations submitted by
the oil companies satisfied their movants' burden to show an
absence of conspiracy and that Aguilar failed to meet her
respondent's burden to make a prima facie showing of an
unlawful conspiracy.36 ' The trial court, on Aguilar's motion
electricity generators and brokers of gouging the state. Davis insists
that the companies should be compelled to rebate $9 billion. Democrats
have been conducting investigative hearings, and Lockyer says he's
pursuing a criminal investigation.... By upholding a higher standard
of proof [for plaintiffs in price fixing suits] ... Mosk's decision will
make it much more difficult for lawsuits to be filed against energy
companies on mere suspicion that they have fixed power prices.

Id.
359. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 503.

360. Id.
361. Id. at 504. The trial court concluded,

"[T]he only logical inference which can be drawn" from Aguilar's
evidence, even after it has been "examin[ed] ...

in its entirety and

without compartmentalization," is that the "actions" of the petroleum
companies

"were

a

pro-competitive

response

to

a

regulatory

requirement which forced members of an oligopoly to restructure their
product mix and incur substantial additional capital expenditures."
Aguilar had "attempted to weave" a "complex, tangled web" of unlawful
conspiracy.

Her evidence, however, "suggest[ed]" only individual

companies "using all available information sources to determine
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for a new trial, reversed its summary judgment ruling based
on its belief that it had applied the wrong legal standard for
determining whether the defendants' declarations were
sufficient to meet their movants' burden.36 In granting a new
trial, the trial court explained that the requirements of
Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank63 were initially
misread, and that the proper standard required the
defendants to submit declarations from "each person
responsible within each company for its capacity, production,
and pricing decisions about CARB gasoline."36 4 The trial court
found that the defendants' submissions did not meet this
exacting standard.366
A unanimous court of appeal reversed the new trial order
and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment order,
reject[ing] the superior court's.., determination that it
made an error in law in its reading and application of
Biljac, finding no support therein for any requirement
that the petroleum companies had to present evidence in
the form of declarations by each person responsible within
each company for its capacity, production, and pricing
decisions about CARB gasoline.366
The supreme court unanimously affirmed the decision.367
In writing for the court, Justice Mosk set out to end six
years of confusion following Union Bank over the summary
judgment standards applicable in California courts.
He
began his analysis by stating, "Our task in this cause is to
clarify the law that courts must apply in ruling on motions for
summary judgment, both in actions generally368 and specifically
in antitrust actions for unlawful conspiracy."
capacity, supply, and pricing decisions which would maximize their
own individual profits - without regard to the profits of their
competitors" and did "not support even the inference of' such a
conspiracy.
Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 504 (alterations in original).
362. Id.
363. 267 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Ct. App. 1990).
364. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 504 (emphasis added).
365. See id. at 504.
366. Id. at 504-05 (emphasis added).
367. See id. at 521. Justice Werdergar apparently did not participate in this
decision. Two court of appeal associate justices - Hollenhorst and Kitching sat by assignment. Justice Kennard, who dissented in both Guz and Saelzler,
joined with the majority in Aguilar in affirming the grant of summary judgment
to the defendants. See id.
368. Id. at 505.
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In Aguilar, the court resolved all doubt that California
summary judgment procedure has essentially caught up with
369 Justice
federal summary judgment practice under Celotex.
Mosk's opinion declared twice that "summary judgment law
in this state now conforms, largely but not completely, to its
federal counterpart as clarified and liberalized in Celotex,
Anderson, and Matsushita."' Citing legislative history, the
court held that the "purpose of the 1992 amendment [to the
summary judgment statute] was 'to move summary judgment
law' in this state 'closer' to its 'federal' counterpart as clarified
in Celotex, Anderson, and Matshushita, in order to liberalize
the granting of such motions."3 7' Relying heavily upon the
foundation laid by the first two trilogy decisions, Guz and
Saelzler, Aguilar posits that in California, summary
judgment law no longer requires "a defendant moving for
summary judgment to conclusively negate an element of the
plaintiffs cause of action."" 2 Just like the federal summary
judgment procedure under the Celotex-Anderson-Matsushita
trilogy, California summary judgment burdens of production
match the trial burdens of production. The Aguilar opinion
states that "how the parties moving for, and opposing,
summary judgment may each carry their burden of
persuasion and/or production depends on which would bear
what burden of proof at trial."373
369. See supra Part II.C.
370. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 509, 512 (emphasis added).
371. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 508. Justice Mosk acknowledged
that the legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments contains
certain summaries at least arguably supporting the perdurance of the
conclusive negation requirement. But it was the 1992 and 1993
amendments "that [were] enacted, not any" such commentary. It is the
former that "must prevail over" the latter, and not the opposite.
Id. at 513 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The difficulty with this
reasoning is that the 1992 amendment's language "cannot be established" is
ambiguous and the legislative history is "remarkably obscure considering the
magnitude of the potential change in the culture of California litigation."
Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Ct. App. 1999).
For a critique of Union Bank's analysis of the legislative history behind the
1992-1993 amendments, see Koppel, supra note 128, at 509-24.
372. Id. at 512. The California Supreme Court's Molko decision, as well as
other case law requiring "a defendant moving for summary judgment to
conclusively negate an element of the plaintiffs cause of action derives from
summary judgment law as it stood prior to the 1992 and 1993 amendments,
does not reflect such law as it stands now, and is accordingly disapproved." Id.
at 515 n.19.
373. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 510.
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By equating summary judgment and directed verdict
standards, 7 4 Aguilar disavows the language in Barnes v. Blue
Haven Pools that "[tihere is nothing in the [summary
judgment] statute which lessens the burden of the moving
party simply because at the trial the resisting party would
have the burden of proof on the issue on which the summary
judgment is sought to be predicated."375 Though a defendant
may choose to negate plaintiffs case by submitting
affirmative evidence, such as affidavits, in support of its
summary judgment motion, it is not required to do so."7
Aguilar's pronouncement that California summary
judgment law conforms to the federal model is limited,
however, by the words "largely but not completely."377
Elsewhere in the court's opinion, Justice Mosk restated this
limitation: "We agree that the 1993 amendment did not
amount to such a 'wholesale adoption.' But... we disagree
with any implication that the parties' burden of persuasion
and/or production on summary judgment is not dependent on
the burden of proof at trial."78
What, then, are the remaining differences between
California and federal summary judgment law and how
significant are these differences? The Celotex decision stated
that a moving defendant could meet its summary judgment
burden to show "no genuine issue of material fact" by
pointing out to the district court the absence of evidence to
support the plaintiffs case. 9 Justice Mosk indicates that
374. The Court stated,
If a party moving for summary judgment in any action . . . would
prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a
trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary
judgment. In such a case, as Justice Chin stated in his concurring
opinion in Guz, the "court should grant" the motion "and avoid a . .
.trial" rendered "useless" by nonsuit or directed verdict or similar
device.
Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 514 (quoting Justice Chin's concurring opinion in Guz, 8
P.2d at 1126).
375. Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1969). See
Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 514 n.25 ("To the extent that Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools,
which was decided under summary judgment law as it stood prior to the 1992
and 1993 amendments, is to the contrary, it is no longer vital inasmuch as such
law as it stands now is materially different.") (citation omitted).
376. See Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 521.
377. Id. at 860 (emphasis added).
378. Id. at 862 n.15 (emphasis added).
379. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
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California summary judgment law parts company with
Celotex in this respect: "Summary judgment law in this state,
however, continues to require a defendant moving for
summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply point
out, that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably
obtain, needed evidence."38 ° Accordingly, the court rejected
"[1]anguage in certain decisions purportedly allowing a
defendant moving for summary judgment simply to 'point[ ]'
out, through argument, 'an absence of evidence to support' an
38
element of plaintiffs cause of action." '
The difference, however, between requiring a moving
defendant to "present evidence" and "simply point[ing] out
through argument" (the corresponding divergence of
California from federal summary judgment law), may be
more apparent than real. The meaning of the phrase "point
out through argument" is ambiguous and the source of much
confusion.382
A minority view within the federal courts, which is also
expressed in a leading treatise on federal procedure, holds
that "the moving party on a summary-judgment motion need
not produce evidence, but simply can argue that there is an
absence of evidence by which the nonmovant can prove his
case." 383 The few decisions that adopt this view reflect a
misunderstanding of Celotex 84
Celotex does employ the phrase "point out" but only in the
context of requiring the moving defendant to affirmatively
"show" or demonstrate to the court, by reference to the record,
380. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 513 (footnote omitted).
381. Id. at 513 n.23. The Court cites Hunter v. Pac. Mech. Corp., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995), as an example of one of those decisions. Id.
382. See generally Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360,
367 n.1 (Ct. App. 1999) ("There is opportunity for confusion inherent in the
vocabulary of the discussion," referring to words like "showing," "demonstrate,"
and "inform."); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,
1102 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The vocabulary used for discussing summary judgment[]
is somewhat abstract.").
383. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15,

§

2720, at 345; SCHWARZER ET AL., supra

note 22, § 14:137, at 14-32, 14-33 ("[Although] [sleveral cases state the opposing

party's lack of evidence may be 'shown' by argument alone... most courts state

the opponent's lack of evidence on an issue must be 'shown' by reference to
materials on file ... demonstrating the opponent will not be able to meet its
evidentiary burden.").
384. See, e.g., Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th
Cir. 2000); Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d
390, 394 (4th Cir. 1994).
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that there is an "absence of evidence to support the
' The word "argument"
nonmoving party's case."385
is not found
anywhere in the Supreme Court's opinion in Celotex.
The court of appeals in Celotex interpreted the Supreme
Court's opinion in Adickes v. S.H. Kress 8 to require the
defendant to support its motion with affirmative evidence
negating plaintiffs case and, therefore, held that Celotex
failed to meet its movant's burden of production when Celotex
submitted the plaintiff's factually devoid interrogatory
answers, which indicated she could not identify any witnesses
to her husband's exposure to Celotex asbestos."'
The Supreme Court reversed, "find[ing] no express or
implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party
support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim."388 The Court held that the
factually devoid interrogatory answers submitted by Celotex
satisfied its movant's burden."
The issue in Celotex,
therefore, revolved around whether the moving defendant
had to submit affirmative evidence in the form of affidavits to
negate an essential element of plaintiffs case or whether the
moving defendant could submit plaintiffs responses to
defendant's discovery requests showing that the plaintiff
lacked its own evidence to meet its burden of production at
trial.390 Although the Court held that the moving defendant
did not have to submit evidence to affirmatively disprove the
negative, the Court did impose an affirmative burden on the
moving defendant to point to the record to demonstrate that
the plaintiff has no case: "[A] summary judgment motion may
properly be made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file.'
Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by
affidavits,
will be 'made and supported as provided in this
9
rule.'"

The Supreme Court disagreed with the position taken by
the court of appeals' majority that "the Adickes language...
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Adickes v. S. H. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-22, 325.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
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should be construed to mean that the burden is on the party
moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with
respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proof."392 The Court's use of the word "evidence"
apparently did not subsume plaintiffs factually devoid
responses to Celotex's interrogatories requesting plaintiff to
identify her causation witnesses. Rather, the Court used the
word "evidence" more narrowly to refer to defendant's
affirmative evidence, such as affidavits, submitted to negate
plaintiffs case. It is in this context that the language
"pointing out" should be interpreted. The Court states, "[Tihe
burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' is an
that is, pointing out to the district court - that therecase.
" ' 393
party's
nonmoving
the
support
to
evidence
of
absence
Justice White's concurring opinion and Justice Brennan's
dissent confirm this interpretation of the Court's opinion.
They argued that a bald assertion by the defendant of an
absence of evidence to support plaintiffs claim is plainly
394
Justice
insufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff.
Brennan agreed with the Court's rejection of the court of
affirmative
appeals' ruling that "the defendant must
" 95 provide
0
case.
plaintiffs
the
evidence disproving
In light of the foregoing, Justice Mosk's distinction
between simply "pointing out," as that phrase is used in
Celotex, and presenting "evidence," as that word is used in
396
the recent California decisions relied upon in Aguilar, is not
meaningful. While Celotex does not use the word "evidence"
to include factually devoid discovery responses, the court of
appeal decisions relied upon by Justice Mosk in Aguilar do
include them.39' In Scheiding, the court of appeal noted that
392. Id. at 325 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit reconciles Adickes and
Celotex by distinguishing them on the grounds that each case addressed
different methods by which a movant may seek to meet its summary judgment
burden. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 110304 (9th Cir. 2000). In Adickes, the moving defendant chose to attempt to negate
the plaintiffs case with affidavits of its own witnesses. Id. While in Celotex,
the moving defendant sought to show an absence of evidence to support the
plaintiffs case. Id.
393. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
394. Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
395. Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
396. Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513-14 (Cal. 2001).
397. See id. at 513 n.22.
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California's summary judgment statute "requires the moving
party to support its motions with evidence in the relatively
'
elaborate form of separate statements." 98
Therefore, "[tihe
statute itself thus implies the corresponding need for concrete
evidence from the moving party and expressly requires the
moving party to supply more than the bare assertion,.. . by
way of argument, that the opposing party has no evidence to
support a particular claim."399
Because the statute expressly requires the moving party
to submit "evidence" to "show" that the plaintiff has no case,
Scheiding, as well as Hagen4 °° and Justice Chin's concurring
opinion in Guz (which relied heavily upon Scheiding), °'
interprets "evidence" to include the opposing party's factually
devoid discovery responses: "We agree with Hunter that the
circumstantial evidence which would be required by Hagen
can consist of 'factually devoid' discovery responses from
4 2
which an absence of evidence can be inferred.""
Scheiding's
application of the above-stated principle to the facts of that
case illustrate the truth of the court's observation that
"[t]here is an opportunity for confusion inherent in the
vocabulary of the discussion." 3
Scheiding, like Celotex, was an asbestos case in which the
plaintiff claimed that he had been exposed to asbestos on job
sites where defendant, Dinwiddie Construction Company
("Dinwiddie"), was present. '4
Dinwiddie's summary
judgment motion "contended that the plaintiffs had no
evidence to suggest Dinwiddie's presence at the work sites
where Robert's asbestos exposure allegedly occurred."4 0
Relying on "several cases holding that a defendant can meet
the burden of proof by showing, through the use of discovery
responses, that a plaintiff has no evidence to support the
case,"'4 6 Dinwiddie based its motion on "the declaration of
398. Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Constr. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 367 (Ct. App.
1999) (emphasis added).
399. Id. (emphasis added).
400. See supra notes 182-92.
401. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1124 (Cal. 2000) (Chin, J.,
concurring).
402. Scheiding, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
403. Id. at 367 n.1.
404. Id. at 361-62.
405. Id. at 362.
406. Id.
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defense counsel stating that [plaintiff] failed to ever mention
4 °7 The court held that
Dinwiddie in the course of discovery."
Dinwiddie failed to carry its movant's burden because
Dinwiddie conducted no discovery. In his deposition
plaintiff was not asked a single question concerning
Dinwiddie.... The plaintiff had no duty to volunteer
information that was not requested. The distinction is
material because without the premise of such a duty,
neither the moving party nor the trial court here could
rely on the inference of completeness which was
fundamental to the holdings of both Union Bank and
Hunter. °5
by
concluded
erroneously
Scheiding opinion
The
as
motion
its
for
basis
proffered
characterizing Dinwiddie's
"mere argument."40 9 The court meant to express its holding
that the plaintiffs deposition testimony, relied upon by
10
Viewed as
Dinwiddie, was not "factually devoid."
the
support
not
did
testimony
circumstantial evidence, the
against
case
logical inference that plaintiff had no
Dinwiddie.4"1'
Scheiding illustrates the point that every movant argues
its motion by pointing out parts of the record that support its
Essentially, the Scheiding court held that
argument.
Dinwiddie failed in its use of discovery to lay the groundwork
for its summary judgment motion. In other words, Dinwiddie
did not do enough to affirmatively demonstrate an absence of
evidence to support the plaintiffs case.
The question that remains unresolved in California
courts after Aguilar, as it did in federal courts after Celotex,
is not whether the moving defendant "must affirmatively
2 The question
show the absence of evidence in the record."
407. Id.
408. Id. at 370-71.
409. Id. at 373.
410. Id. at 370.
411. Id. at 372. Other post-Union Bank decisions in the California Court of
Appeal have held that factually vague deposition responses by plaintiff
supported a moving defendant's summary judgment burden. See Hunter v. Pac.
Mech. Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995). But see Hagen v.
Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 208 (Ct. App. 1995) (questioning the
conclusion of Hunter, decided in a different district of the appeals court, "that
'factually vague' deposition responses by the plaintiff himself sufficed, in the
circumstances of that case, to shift the burden to the plaintiff.").
412. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
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is, rather, how much affirmative discovery must the moving

defendant engage in to meet its movant's burden on summary
judgment?
A close reading of the Supreme Court's Celotex opinion
reveals that mere conclusory assertions, either in an
attorney's declaration or in a memorandum of points and
authorities, that the opposing plaintiff has no evidence is
insufficient to satisfy the moving defendant's summary
judgment burden. 413

The few contrary federal decisions414

holding that mere argument, unsupported by specific
references to the record, is sufficient represent a minority
view that incorrectly interprets Celotex. Under both Celotex
and Aguilar, the moving defendant must take affirmative
steps, including adequately utilizing discovery, to show an
absence of evidence to support the opposing party's case." 5 A
recent opinion of the Ninth Circuit, Nissan Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos.,46 reflects the majority view that the

moving defendant in federal court still bears a significant
burden under Celotex:
We note that Celotex did not hold that a moving party
without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial may
use a summary judgment motion as a substitute for
discovery.... In a typical case, in order to carry its initial
burden of production by pointing to the absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's claim or
defense, the moving party will have made reasonable
efforts, using the normal tools of discovery, to discover
whether the nonmoving party has enough evidence to

dissenting) (emphasis added).
413. See, e.g., id. at 328 (White, J., concurring) ("It is not enough to move for
summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a
conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case."); id. at
332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Plainly, a conclusory assertion that the
nonmoving party has no evidence is insufficient."). But see Cray
Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., 33 F.3d 390, 393 (4th Cir.
1994) ("[Ulnder Celotex, 'the moving party on a summary judgment motion need
not produce evidence, but simply can argue that there is an absence of evidence
by which the nonmovant can prove his case."').
414. See Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, Corp., 212 F.3d 528 (9th
Cir. 2000); Cray Communications, 33 F.3d at 390.
415. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 14-32, 14-33 (providing the
practice pointer: "Avoid any uncertainty. Do not rely solely on argument to
make your showing. Utilize discovery procedures to force disclosures
establishing the opposing party has no evidence to support some element of its
claim or defense.").
416. 210 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2000).

2002]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

carry its burden of persuasion at trial.417
Although it is clear that under both Aguilar and Celotex
the moving defendant who seeks to show an absence of
evidence to support the plaintiffs case must engage in
reasonable discovery to lay the foundation for its summary
judgment motion, the question that requires judicial
clarification418 is, what constitutes reasonable discovery in a
given case?
The Celotex Court fragmented over the question of what
affirmative419steps a moving defendant must take to satisfy the
"showing."
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Chief
Justice Berger and Justice Blackmun, chided the majority for
"giving insufficient guidance to the district courts" on this
420
issue.
Justice Brennan's dissent noted that where "the moving
party [opted to] demonstrate to the Court that the nonmoving
party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim.., a conclusory
assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is
insufficient." 12 The dissent, while agreeing with the movant's
burden standard adopted by the majority, did not agree with
4 22
Notwithstanding
its application to the facts of the case.
Mrs. Catrett's failure to identify any witnesses to her
deceased husband's exposure to defendant's asbestos in
response to defendant's interrogatories, the record did
indicate the existence of potential testimony from her
husband's former supervisor regarding the deceased's
exposure to Celotex asbestos. 4 23 Justice Brennan's dissent
concluded that Celotex had a burden to affirmatively
demonstrate the absence of relevant testimony by the
supervisor by deposing the supervisor; because Celotex failed

417. Id. at 1105 (citations omitted).
418. Districts in the California Court of Appeal disagree over the sufficiency
of the moving defendant's discovery activities to show the insufficiency of
plaintiff's case to create a triable issue. Compare Hagan v. Hickenbottom, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Ct. App. 1995), with Hunter v. Pac. Mech. Corp., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995). See also text accompanying supra notes 1.72-192.
419. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
420. Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
422. See id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
423. See id. at 336-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to do so, it did not meet its movant's burden.4 24
Justice Brennan's dissent suggested concrete ways in
which a moving defendant may seek to demonstrate or show
an absence of evidence to support plaintiffs case:
[A]s the Court confirms, a party who moves for summary
judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party has no
evidence must affirmatively show the absence of evidence
in the record. This may require the moving party to
depose the nonmoving party's witnesses or to establish the
inadequacy of the documentary evidence. [Or] the moving
party may demonstrate this by reviewing for the court the
admissions, interrogatories and other exchanges between
the parties that are in the record. Either way, however,
the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate that
there is no evidence in the record to support a judgment
for the nonmoving party.425
The Aguilar opinion, like the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Celotex, while providing much-needed guidance on
the principles of California summary judgment law, provides
insufficient guidance to trial courts in the practical
application of those principles. It is unclear precisely what a
moving defendant must do to satisfy the requirement that it
present evidence to show an absence of evidence to support
the plaintiffs case.
The Aguilar court indicates that some forms of factually
devoid discovery responses that show the plaintiff has "no
case" will suffice. 42r The court stated that "[t]he defendant
may [also] present evidence that the plaintiff does not
possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence - as
through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive
4 27
discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing."
What, short of an express (and unlikely) concession by
the plaintiff that it has no case, will satisfy the court's
standard? Taking a leaf from Justice Brennan's dissent in
Celotex, must the defendant scour the record for potential
evidence that might support the plaintiffs case and negate
these through discovery?
Aguilar, like Saelzler, extends the holding of Union Bank
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id.
Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 513-14 (Cal. 2001).
Id. (emphasis added).
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beyond the use of factually devoid discovery responses to
prove that plaintiff has no case. Where defendant's discovery
does reveal the existence of some evidence that plaintiff will
likely present at trial, Aguilar, like Celotex, permits the
moving defendant to demonstrate that such evidence would
be legally insufficient to forestall a directed verdict motion by
the defendant at trial. Citing Saelzler, and quoting from
Justice Chin's concurring opinion in Guz, the Court states,
To speak broadly, all of the foregoing discussion of
summary judgment law in this state, like that of its
federal counterpart, may be reduced to, and justified by, a
single proposition: If a party moving for summary
judgment in any action.., would prevail at trial without
submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact
for determination, then he should prevail on summary
judgment. In such case, as Justice Chin stated in his
concurring opinion in Guz, the 'court should grant' the
motion 'and avoid a ...trial' rendered 'useless' by nonsuit
428
or directed verdict or similar device.
Under the actual facts of Aguilar, the moving defendants
did not seek to demonstrate an absence of evidence to support
Aguilar's case, through factually devoid discovery responses
Rather, the oil companies submitted
or otherwise.
affirmative evidence in the form of declarations from fewer
than all of their officers and managers who played a role in
capacity, production and pricing decisions. 429 Had the case
proceeded to trial, the defendants would have called these
employees to the stand during their case in chief to attempt
to persuade the jury that the defendants did not collude to
restrict output and raise prices.
Justice Mosk observed that "[t]he defendant may, but
need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an
element of the plaintiffs cause of action. '430 When a moving
defendant submits its own affirmative evidence, such as
declarations from the defendant's own high level employees
denying that they engaged in actionable conduct on behalf of
their employer (as was the case in Aguilar and Guz), what is
the standard of sufficiency such affirmative evidence must
meet to shift the burden to the plaintiff? Must this evidence
428. Id. at 514.
429. See id. at 502-03.
430. Id. at 513.

554

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

be "conclusive?"
The court implies that the evidence must be conclusive.431
However, where the moving defendant chooses to conclusively
negate the plaintiffs case, the Aguilar decision seems to have
lessened the burden here also by redefining what it takes for
evidence to be "conclusive." The trial court in Aguilar, in
deciding that it improperly granted summary judgment, read
Biljac to require that the oil companies submit declarations
from "each person responsible within each company for its
capacity, production, and pricing decisions. '43 2 This rigorous
requirement is consistent with Biljac's ruling that the moving
defendant conclusively negate plaintiffs case.
The oil
companies' submissions in support of their motion did not
satisfy this rigorous requirement. 43 3 The Aguilar court agreed
with the court of appeal's ruling that the superior court
"misread and misappl[ied]" Biljac.434 Observing that Biljac,
decided in 1990, did not interpret the current summary
judgment law as amended in 1992 and 1993, the court stated:
Biljac held at most that declarations by each person
responsible within each of certain entities for certain
decisions were sufficient under summary judgment law as
it stood prior to the 1992 and 1993 amendments to negate
an unlawful conspiracy, presumably conclusively. Biljac
did not hold that declarations by officers and managers
and similar employees of the sort that the petroleum
companies presented here were insufficient under
summary judgment law as it stands now even to carry
their initial burden of production to make a prima facie
showing of the absence of any conspiracy.435
Justice Mosk wrote that the oil companies met their
movant's burden to show the nonexistence of a triable issue of
conspiracy:
Through the declarations by their officers and managers
and similar employees -- and through material from
others including third parties -- [the defendants]
presented evidence that would require a reasonable jury
not to find any conspiracy more likely than not. The
declarations in question, it must be emphasized, generally
431. See id.

432. Id. at 504-05 (emphasis added).
433. Id. at 504.

434. Id.
435. Id. at 520 (emphasis added at end of quotation) (citation omitted).
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stated on personal knowledge how the companies made
their capacity, production, and pricing decisions about
CARB gasoline. Hence, they did more than baldly assert
that they made them independently, and did more than
baldly deny that they made them collusively with each
other.436
The declarations of some employees submitted by the oil
companies that they did not collude with competitors to fix
prices, did not account for all employees who played a role in
capacity, production and pricing decisions." 7 Under a strict
application of Barnes's conclusive negation standard, Aguilar
might have successfully challenged the sufficiency of these
declarations on grounds of completeness.438 However, Aguilar
appears to have also overruled or, at least modified, this
aspect of Barnes by allowing the defendants to submit
declarations from fewer than all pertinent employees. In
doing so, the court has apparently lessened the burden of a
defendant who chooses to support its motion with paper
evidence of its own affirmative case directed to that
element.43 9
Also, Aguilar relaxed the conclusive negation standard
by implicitly holding that declarations of defendants' highlevel employees did not create triable issues of credibility. As
in Guz, the defendants' witnesses were interested employees,
each of whom denied engaging in actionable conduct.4 Such
witnesses would be vulnerable to bias impeachment at trial. 4

436. Id. at 518 (footnote omitted).
437. Id. at 502-03.
438. Barnes explained that "[tihere are, of course, cases . . . where the
moving defendant, by its affidavits, effectively precluded any possibility of
recovery by the plaintiff in the absence of a challenge to their veracity or
completeness." Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App.
1969) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
439. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1104
(9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit, in Nissan, by closely comparing the Adickes
and Celotex opinions, observed that a moving defendant without the ultimate
burden of persuasion at trial may seek to support its motion either by offering
affirmative evidence to negate the plaintiffs case or by "showing" an absence of
evidence to support plaintiffs case. See id. at 1106. The Ninth Circuit also
suggested that a moving defendant who seeks to negate plaintiffs case must do
so completely, with no "unexplained gaps," noting the holding in Adickes that
defendant did not successfully negate the plaintiffs case because of such gaps in
the affidavits submitted by Kress. Id. at 1104.
440. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 502-03.
441. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 324c(e) (Deering 2002).
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C. The Respondent's Burden: Setting a High Standard of
Sufficiency
In each of the trilogy decisions, the California Supreme
Court lessened the burden on the moving defendant in a
summary judgment motion, thereby making it easier for
defendants to shift the burden to the nonmoving plaintiff to
produce evidence that a triable issue exists.442 In each case,
once the burden shifted to the plaintiff, the court's trilogy
increased the respondent's burden, making it more difficult
for the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to forestall
summary judgment. 43 The supreme court in each of these

decisions required the plaintiffs evidence to meet a very high
standard of sufficiency to satisfy the respondent's burden.444
In the process, the supreme court came close to weighing the
strength of plaintiffs case, substituting summary judgment
for the trial itself.
These were not cases, like Union Bank, in which the
plaintiff revealed through factually devoid discovery
responses that there was a complete absence of evidence to
support plaintiffs burden of production at trial.443 In each of
the trilogy cases, a supreme court majority found that the
plaintiffs case was not strong enough to create a triable issue.
Two of these decisions, Guz and Saelzler, reversed a split
court of appeal and were met with dissents, indicating that
judges differed on whether a jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff. In the third decision of the trilogy, Aguilar, the
court followed the controversial Matsushita decision that
paved the way in federal court for more aggressive use of
summary judgment in complex antitrust matters to resolve
subjective issues of motive and intent. 446

442. See supra Part III.A.
443. See supra Part III.A.
444. See supra Part III.A.
445. See supra Part III.A.
446. See Patricia M. Wald, Federal Practice and Procedure Symposium
Honoring Charles Alan Wright: Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1897, 1907 (1998).
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Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.: The Age
DiscriminationClaim447
Once the supreme court had ruled that Bechtel had met
its movant's burden to show a nondiscriminatory reason for
firing Guz, the burden shifted to Guz to block summary
1.

judgment. 448

To meet this burden, Guz had to present

sufficiently persuasive evidence that a jury could render a
reasoned verdict in his favor. The court's majority ruled that
Guz failed to meet his respondent's burden. 449

The court

found Guz's rebuttal "unpersuasive," "weak" and lacking in
"sufficient probative force" to support a rational inference of
intentional age discrimination when weighed against
"Bechtel's strong and unrebutted showing that it took its
actions for nondiscriminatory reasons ....

"..

The majority

concluded that Guz's prima facie case, though technically
sufficient, "raise[d], at most, a weak inference of prohibited
bias.""5' In making this subjective evaluation of the strength
447. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000). Although the Court's
opinion addresses Guz's three causes of action, this analysis focuses on the
Court's treatment of Guz's age discrimination claim because it sheds more light
than the other two claims on the current status of summary judgment law in
California.
448. See id. at 1115. The California Supreme Court ruled that Bechtel
submitted sufficient evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for eliminating
Guz's work unit and "thereafter, cho[osing] persons other than Guz for vacant
positions in the unit to which [the phased-out unit's] functions were
transferred" to meet movant Bechtel's burden. Id. Bechtel's proffered reasons
for eliminating Guz's work unit were a downturn in workload and a desire to
cut costs. Id. at 1120. Bechtel also presented evidence that the younger
persons chosen over Guz to fill the vacant positions in the new unit were
qualified for their positions, which was uncontradicted by Guz. See id.
449. See id. at 1112 ("None of Guz's theories is persuasive.").
450. Id.
451. Id. at 1118 n.25.
Disagreeing with Justice Chin's concurring opinion, Justice Kennard
concluded that Guz's evidence
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
under the McDonnell Douglas test: (1) He was over 40 years of age
when terminated; (2) his job performance exceeded Bechtel's legitimate
expectations (he was promoted six times, and was given 17 merit
raises, and he received a Silver Performance Plus Award for saving the
company $1.7 million; his 1991 performance review described him as a
'strong performer in his group'; and in his 22 years at Bechtel, he was
never told his skills were deficient); and (3) Bechtel treated younger
workers more favorably than older workers by transferring from the
disbanded BNI-MI unit (where Guz was employed) to SFRO-MI and
selecting for two of the three new SFRO-MI positions, workers between
seven and 15 years younger than Guz: and by retaining the two
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of Guz's prima facie case, the court emphasized that the size
of Guz's statistical sample was not large enough to show a
pattern of discrimination4 .. and that the workers who filled
the vacant positions were not young enough to support an
inference of age-based preference.4"3 Additionally, the court
refused
to
credit
Guz's
evidence
that
Bechtel's
nondiscriminatory reasons were false and, therefore, a
pretext for age related bias .
The court emphasized that
"Guz made substantial concessions to the truth of Bechtel's
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to
eliminate BNI MI and for choosing others to fill positions at
SFROMI."45 5
Although Justice Mosk in his concurrence conceded that
"the question [was] close," he nonetheless agreed with the
majority that Guz failed to meet his respondent's burden "in
light of Guz's concessions as to the nondiscriminatory nature
of many of [Bechtel's] actions, and in light of the weakness of
Guz's prima facie case .... 4 5 6
Justice Kennard dissented, concluding, as did a majority
of justices in the California Court of Appeal decision, that
"the evidence does show a triable issue of fact, and that
plaintiff deserves a trial on the merits to determine whether
he lost his job for legitimate business reasons or because of
illegal age discrimination."457 Evaluating the same evidence
as the majority, Justice Kennard found that "Guz could still
prevail at trial" based upon his prima facie case of age
discrimination and his "sufficient additional evidence from
youngest of the six workers at BNI-MI, while terminating the two
oldest.
Id. at 1132 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
452. See id. at 1122 ("[T]he premise that Bechtel purposely favored two
workers on the basis of youth when deciding which BNI-MI employees to retain
is weakened, for statistical purposes, by the small size of that unit, which
included only six persons.").
453. See id. ("Moreover, an issue arises whether the younger persons with
whom Guz seeks comparison were younger enough to raise a logical suspicion of
intentional age bias.").
454. See id. at 1121 ("In sum, we see no grounds in this record for an
inference that Bechtel has materially dissembled in explaining the reasons,
unrelated to chronological age, for the personnel decisions leading to Guz's
dismissal."). But see id. at 1130 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (reciting the evidence
Guz presented to show Bechtel's reasons for terminating Guz were pretextual).
455. Id. at 1119 (emphasis omitted).
456. Id. at 1124 (Mosk, J., concurring).
457. Id. at 1134 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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which a reasonable fact finder could reject 'the employer's
Justice Kennard
asserted justification [as] false."'4 58
suggested the court's imposition on Guz of a high standard of
sufficiency of the evidence on summary judgment undercut
California's public policy against age discrimination in
Perceiving a
employment reflected in the FEHA.459
and the
standards
judgment
summary
between
connection
enforceability of substantive rights, Justice Kennard wrote,
The nature and purpose of the prohibition against age
discrimination in employment should be kept in mind
when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence and the
allocation of the proof burdens on a summary judgment
460
motion in an age discrimination case.
The evidence submitted by the plaintiff in Guz can be
accurately characterized as presenting a close case, not "no
case" as in Union Bank and Celotex. In Union Bank and
Celotex, the plaintiffs could not identify a single witness to
testify to the material facts in response to defendants'
interrogatories as to which defendant claimed there was no
genuine issue.46 1 In Guz, the majority assessed the probative
strength and persuasiveness of Guz's case on the critical
issue of Bechtel's subjective intent in terminating Guz's
employment and weighed Guz's evidence against Bechtel's
evidence of nondiscriminatory motive.462 Motive and intent
are questions of fact traditionally reserved for jury
Since employers rarely, if ever, make
determination.46 3
statements that candidly admit to discriminatory intent
458. Id.
459. See id. at 1130.
460. Id. at 1132 n.2.
461. But see id. at 1112 (Chin, J., concurring) ("Guz has presented no
meaningful evidence whatsoever, direct or circumstantial, suggesting age
discrimination.").
462. See id. at 1112. The majority compares Guz's "weak" statistical
evidence of age bias against Bechtel's "strong and unrebutted showing that
[Bechtel] took its actions for nondiscriminatory reasons. . .

."

Id.

463. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2730, at 7 ("Inasmuch as a
determination of someone's state of mind usually entails the drawing of factual
inferences as to which reasonable people might differ - a function traditionally
left to the jury - summary judgment often will be an inappropriate means of
resolving an issue of this character."). But see BRUNET ET AL., supra note 117, §
6.12, at 201 ("While courts may be 'cautious' about granting motions for
summary judgment in cases involving motive and intent, in cases brought...
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act... such a question may, in
appropriate situations, be resolved by summary judgment.").
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when firing an employee, Guz's case, like most age
discrimination cases, is circumstantial.46 4 In the words of a
leading treatise on age discrimination law:
[Tihere is some awkwardness in using the summary
judgment device in [the age discrimination] context. For
what is at issue ... is the matter of intent. In other
words, the plaintiff in an [age discrimination case] must
establish the existence of discriminatory intent on the
defendant's part. Given the subtleties and nuances
involved, almost invariably there will be a dispute as to
this issue, which of course clearly is a material factor in
every discriminatory treatment claim. Accordingly, it
might be concluded that summary judgment will hardly
ever be4 5a suitable basis for resolving [age discrimination]
claims.
Reasonable judges, on both the court of appeal and the
supreme court, evaluating the same evidence, sharply
differed on the issue of sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence to
create a triable issue for the jury."
The supreme court's
opinion comes close to crossing the line that separates the
functions of judge and jury by weighing the probative
strength of Guz's case against Bechtel's case. Rather than
letting jurors decide whether they were persuaded by Guz's
evidence, a majority of the justices appear to have made that
determination themselves in a summary trial. Though Guz's
case may have arguably been "weak," summary judgment
was not originally intended to winnow out weak cases from
trial.46 ' In close cases like this one, where judges diverge on a
464. See, e.g., Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1996).
465. 2 HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 7.55 at 346 (2d ed. 1994).

But see Krenick v. LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[E]mployment
discrimination cases involving motive and intent [are not exempted] from
summary judgment procedures .... [The] plaintiff must still present sufficient
evidence to permit a jury [were the case to go to the jury,] to find that the
defendant's proffered reason is merely a pretext for intentional
discrimination.").
466. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1099 ("[W]hether a downturn in workload was the
real reason for Bechtel's action was in legitimate dispute.").
467. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2725, at 432 ("Therefore, a
party moving for summary judgment is not entitled to a judgment merely
because the facts the party offers appear more plausible than those tendered in
opposition, or because it appears that the adversary is unlikely to prevail at
trial."). Similarly, Jeffrey Stempel has noted that
Under [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)], the judge
now has greater license to eliminate the jury prior to trial. Previously,
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question of fact, courts should proceed cautiously, erring in
favor of a full development of the record at trial.468
Guz represents a tactical victory for employers in
California who may find courts increasingly willing to
aggressively use summary judgment to dismiss weak
discrimination cases.469 In federal court, defendants in age
discrimination suits commonly employ summary judgment to
prevent plaintiffs' cases from being heard by sympathetic
the chances of the employer prevailing
juries, "where
47 °
decrease."
Based on the rise in the number of Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") cases determined by summary
judgment in federal court under the influence of the Celotex
trilogy,471 it is reasonable to predict that Guz will trigger an
of employment
dispositions
summary
in
increase
discrimination cases in California state court as well.
Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
Once the majority concluded that the property owner had
met its movant's burden,472 a crippling burden of production
2.

the judge had to wait until at least mid-trial before her excursion into
what many regarded as jury territory could begin. By deciding, before
full development of the record at trial, that the nonmovant's side of a
disputed factual story is not sufficiently probative to support a verdict
by a reasonable jury, the judge can more easily eliminate not only
claims that she finds unpersuasive in the instant case but also legal
rights with which she is unsympathetic.
Stempel, supra note 12, at 167.
468. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1134 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard
believed that Guz was such a case:
Guz's lawsuit against Bechtel is now at the summary judgment stage,
where the question to be decided is whether the evidence submitted by
Guz and Bechtel shows there is an issue of material fact in dispute that
needs to be resolved by a full trial in open court. Unlike the majority, I
conclude that the evidence does show a triable issue of fact, and that
plaintiff deserves a trial on the merits to determine whether he lost his
job for legitimate reasons or because of illegal age discrimination.
Because the majority denies plaintiff the opportunity to prove his case
at trial, I dissent.
Id.
469. The tactical significance of the Guz appeal motivated interest groups to
file amicus briefs for plaintiff (American Association for Retired Persons) and
for defendant (California Chamber of Commerce, Employers Group, California
Employment Law Council).
470. See EGLIT, supra note 465, § 7.55, at 343.
471. Id. at 346, 348.
472. The Court's decision in Saelzler lessened the movant's burden in two
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shifted to Ms. Saelzler that required her to identify her
assailants, a burden she ultimately could not meet.473
Reversing the superior court's summary judgment in
favor of the property owner, a divided court of appeal ruled
that Ms. Saelzler's evidence created a triable issue on
causation:
This is a case where the property owner flagrantly failed
to provide any security - at least during the time of day
plaintiff was attacked. There is no question but this
apartment complex had a duty to protect against criminal
assaults of this nature. They had occurred frequently on
the property and thus were highly foreseeable. As to the
standard of care, the property owner completely failed any
test of reasonableness by supplying no security at all and even allowing the "locked" gates to fall into disrepair.
When a property owner supplies no security whatsoever to say nothing of when it falls below the standard of care
appropriate to the threat of crime on the premises - logic
and common sense tell us absence of security is a
contributing cause of most crimes on that property.4 4
ways. First, the Court adopted the federal standard that allows a moving
defendant to point to the absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs case. See
supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text. Second, the Court extended the
application of that relaxed standard beyond the Celotex- Union Bank scenario in
which defendant could show, through factually devoid discovery responses, that
plaintiff had no case. See supra notes 321-26. The court of appeal and Justices
Kennard, Werdergar and Mosk argued that Ms. Saelzler had presented a
compelling case of negligence, including proximate cause. See Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 112 (Ct. App. 1999) ("In cases like
this one, where there was a clear duty to provide security and absolutely none
was provided, it makes no sense - in logic or in policy - to hold this complete
absence of security was not a cause of a given crime when that security would
have substantially reduced the probability the crime would have occurred.");
Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1162 (Cal. 2001) (Werdergar, J.,
dissenting) ("Indisputably, a reasonable jury in this case could conclude,
contrary to the majority, that 'roving guards would have encountered
[plaintiffs] assailants or prevented the attack."').
473. See, e.g., Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1161 (Werdergar, J., dissenting)
("Moreover, in requiring plaintiff to 'prove [her assailants] would not have
succeeded in assaulting her if defendants had provided additional security
precautions,' the majority both misstates the applicable proof burden and places
it on the wrong party. Plaintiff need only raise 'a triable issue' of fact."
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)); id. at 1155 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
("The [Court's] holding places a virtually insurmountable barrier in the path of
any plaintiff seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered as a
result of a property owner's unreasonable failure to provide security to protect
against foreseeable third party criminal acts.").
474. Saelzler, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
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A divided supreme court reversed, placing upon Ms.
Saelzler the burden to identify her attackers "to prove that
they would not have succeeded in assaulting her if
defendants had provided additional security precautions."
The majority concluded that without such identification, a
jury could only speculate on causation." 6 Mixing policy
considerations more appropriate to the issues of duty and
'
breach of duty with the factual question of causation," the
majority explained that it is entirely speculative that the
attack on Ms. Saelzler could have been avoided had the
defendants increased security measures, "as assaults and
other crimes can occur despite the maintenance of the highest
level of security."4 "8
The court held that Ms. Saelzler's case on causation was
speculative because there was no way for the jury to
rationally determine whether the lack of security precautions
would have deterred her particular assailants from
assaulting her. They went on to state that
Plaintiff admits she cannot prove the identity or
background of her assailants. They might have been
unauthorized trespassers, but they also could have been
tenants of defendants' apartment complex, who were
authorized and empowered to enter the locked security
gates and remain on the premises. The primary reasons
for having functioning security gates and guards stationed
at every entrance would be to exclude unauthorized
persons and trespassers from entering. But plaintiff has
not shown that her assailants were indeed unauthorized
to enter. Given the substantial number of incidents and
disturbances involving defendants' own tenants, and
defendants' manager's statement that a juvenile gang was
"headquartered" in one of the buildings, the assault on
plaintiff could well have been made by tenants having
authority to enter and remain on the premises. That
being so,. . . [plaintiff] cannot show that defendants'
failure to provide increased daytime security at each
475. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1161.
476. Id. at 1155 ("The evidence at hand... merely shows the speculative
possibility that additional daytime security guards and/or functioning security
gates might have prevented the assault.").
477. See id. at 1164 (Werdergar, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's
concern that tenants of low cost housing would ultimately bear the costs of
imposing liability for failure to provide security).
478. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1152.
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entrance gate or functioning locked gates was a
substantial factor in causing her injuries. 479
Following the federal summary judgment standard,
articulated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,48 ° the court in
Saelzler injects the burden of persuasion standard, applicable
to the jury's deliberations at trial, into the judge's pre-trial
determination whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to preclude summary judgment. In so doing, the
California Supreme Court has made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to successfully oppose summary judgment in
California Superior Court.
The court measured the
sufficiency of Ms. Saelzler's evidence according to the
preponderanceof the evidence burden of persuasion standard.
Applying this standard, the court concluded that Ms. Saelzler
was "unable to prove it was 'more probable than not' that
additional security precautions would have prevented the
attack"48 ' and, therefore, did not meet her respondent's
burden.4 82 Thus, Saelzler opens the door to judicial evaluation
of the persuasiveness of the plaintiffs case on summary
judgment, much as the jury would do during its deliberations
at trial. In this respect, Saelzler parallels the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby that instructed
lower federal courts to evaluate the opposing plaintiffs
evidence on summary judgment according to the "clear and
convincing evidence" burden of persuasion applicable to the
jury's deliberations at the close of trial.48
Justice Kennard criticized this aspect of the majority's
opinion in Saelzler, asserting that it blurs the critical
distinction 84 between issue finding and issue determination,
which the California Supreme Court once called the "pivot"
upon which California's summary judgment law traditionally
turns. 8 ' In Justice Kennard's words,
[T]he critical inquiry at the summary judgment stage is
not whether the court ruling on a summary judgment
motion ... concludes the plaintiff has produced evidence
479. Id. at 1151-52.
480. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the federal summary judgment standard.
481. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1152.
482. Id. at 1155.
483. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
484. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
485. Walsh v. Walsh, 116 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. 1941).
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that an element of the plaintiffs cause of action is more
probable than not. Rather, it is whether the plaintiff has
produced evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish
that an element of the cause of action is more probable
for summary
than not.... A judge ruling on a motion
486
fact.
of
a
trier
as
judgment is not sitting
This critique is reminiscent of Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Anderson where he expressed his fear "that this
new rule ... will transform what is meant to provide an
expedited 'summary' procedure into a full-blown paper trial
on the merits."4 7
The court of appeal majority and the dissenting supreme
court justices agreed that requiring Ms. Saelzler to identify
her assailants was tantamount to requiring her to prove
causation with certainty. 488 Although the majority purported
to apply the substantial factor test of causation, Justice
Werdergar's dissent criticized the majority for distorting the
application of that test, "improperly suggesting it burdens
plaintiff with proving it more probable than not that
48 9
defendants' carelessness caused her injuries." In effect, this
placed the burden on Ms. Saelzler to show with certainty that
the assault would not have occurred but for the absence of
reasonable security measures. As noted in Justice Kennard's
dissent, "[elven at trial,490 a plaintiff need not establish
causation with certainty.
The court of appeal and supreme court justices who
opposed granting the defendant's summary judgment motion
agreed that the property owner, not Ms. Saelzler, should bear
the burden to show Ms. Saelzler's assailants were atypical
criminals who would have committed the assault even in the
49
presence of roving security patrols. ' In this regard, Justice
486. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
487. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 266.
488. See Saelzler, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110; Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1156
(Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Even at trial, a plaintiff need not establish causation
with certainty."); id. at 1160 (Werdergar, J., dissenting) ("Similarly, no one can
say with certainty that heightened security would have deterred the attempted
rape of plaintiff, nor is the plaintiffs burden.").
489. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1161 (Werdergar, J., dissenting) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
490. Id. at 1156 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
491. Saelzler, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112 ("Before a defendant is allowed
summary judgment the evidence should conclusively establish the general
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Kennard wrote,
Although there may be some criminals so reckless as to
attack a person in broad daylight notwithstanding the
presence of security guards, common sense suggests that
such criminals are a minority. Knowing nothing about
plaintiffs never apprehended assailants, a jury might
reasonably conclude that such individuals are more likely
to be among the typical class of criminals who would be
deterred by the presence of security guards instead of
among the reckless few who would not.4 92
Saelzler was not a case where the plaintiff could present no
evidence in support of a rational inference of causation, as in
an auto collision case where there are no eyewitnesses to the
accident nor any circumstantial evidence, such as skid marks,
from which to rationally infer causation. The justices in
Saelzler who opposed summary judgment for the defendant
agreed with Justice Werdergar that plaintiffs causation
evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue.9 She stated,
"Indisputably, a reasonablejury in this case could conclude,
contrary to the majority, that 'roving guards would have
encountered
[plaintiffs] assailants or prevented the
494
attack.
As in Guz, reasonable justices in Saelzler, both on the
court of appeal and the supreme court, evaluated the same
evidence, yet their views diverged as to the sufficiency of the
evidence necessary to create a jury issue on a question of fact.
Specifically, they differed sharply on the question whether,
based on Ms. Saelzler's evidence, a jury could only speculate
or rationally infer that defendant's admitted breach of duty to
Ms. Saelzler, substantially contributed to her attack.49 The
justices also disagreed on where to draw the line between
questions of fact, to be determined by the jury, and questions

causal connection between absence of security and criminal activity does not
apply in this case by showing this particular criminal would have committed
this crime against this victim despite the presence of reasonable security
measures.").
492. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
493. Id. ("Here, plaintiff offered evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find that defendants' failure to maintain their property in a safe
condition was more than a minimal cause of plaintiff cause of plaintiffs
assault.").
494. Id. at 1162 (Werdergar, J., dissenting).
495. Id. at 1160.
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of law, to be judicially determined.4 96 The court of appeal
majority and the dissenting supreme court justices
emphatically argued that the causation issue in Saelzler was
one "peculiarly for the jury," that "cannot be decided as a
matter of law."497
These differences illustrate the fundamental point that
the question, whether a plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to
meet its burden of production, on summary judgment or trial,
though denominated as a question of law, is a subjective
question over which judges, evaluating the same evidence,
can differ widely. Courts should therefore exercise extreme
caution in such cases before denying a plaintiff its
opportunity to fully develop its case before a jury.
In the new era of summary judgment in California,
Saelzler raises fundamental questions concerning the
appropriate relationship between a newly invigorated
summary judgment procedure and the appropriate role of the
jury in California's civil justice system. Does Saelzler portend
a shift in the line that divides the functions of judge and jury?
Saelzler should provoke thoughtful consideration about what
compromises Californians are willing to make to balance the
right to a jury determination of factual issues based on a fully
developed record against the need to efficiently manage
overcrowded court dockets.
3.

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

Aguilar's significance, in terms of summary judgment
law, lies chiefly in its teaching about the movant's burden
and what steps the defendant must take to shift the burden
to the plaintiff to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of the
plaintiffs case at trial.
Less significant is the court's holding that the class
action plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to meet her

496. See, e.g., id. at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("A judge ruling on a
motion for summary judgment is not sitting as a trier of fact. When, as here,
the plaintiff has a triable issue of material fact it is the jury that must decide
the issue.").
497. Id. at 1160 (Werdergar, J., dissenting). See also Saelzler v. Advanced
Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 110 (Ct. App. 1999) ("So under elemental
common law principles the very causal connection at dispute in this case is one
of those which is properly established by 'common experience' and is a jury
question inappropriate for summary judgment.").
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respondent's burden.49 Once the court ruled that the oil
companies had met their movant's burden, the burden shifted
to Aguilar to present evidence sufficient to survive a directed
verdict motion at trial.49 s The court applied the standard
utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Matsushita to
determine the sufficiency of Aguilar's case, thereby increasing
the nonmoving plaintiffs burden in opposing a summary
judgment motion in an antitrust action brought in state court
under California's Cartwright Act. 0 °
Matsushita, one of the U.S. Supreme Court's trilogy of
summary judgment opinions, expanded the application of
summary judgment in federal antitrust cases by overruling
the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.,"' which cautioned restraint in

utilizing summary judgment to resolve antitrust cases:
We believe that summary procedures should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and
intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands
of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken
the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and
subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the
weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. 502
In Matsushita, a sharply divided Supreme Court
abandoned this restrictive view, signaling a more aggressive
role for federal summary judgment in antitrust cases and
substantially increasing the responding plaintiffs burden to
oppose a defendant's summary judgment motion.0 ' In a five
to four decision, the Matsushita Court held that where a
plaintiffs antitrust claim is "implausible," that is, "if the
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense,
respondents must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be
498. See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 518 (Cal. 2001) ("Aguilar
did not carry the burden of production shifted onto her shoulders to make a
prima facie showing of the presence of an unlawful conspiracy.").
499. Id. at 514.
500. See supra note 227.
501. Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
502. Id. at 473.
503. See BRUNET ET AL, supra note 117, at 264 ("Despite obvious
uncertainties, the general thrust of Matsushita is to subject antitrust
conspiracy cases to the possibility of summary disposition and to place upon the
plaintiff an additional evidentiary burden when relying on ambiguous
circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of a conspiracy.").
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necessary."" 4 Additionally, where an antitrust plaintiffs case
proves conduct by defendant that is "as consistent with
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy," such
evidence is insufficient to support a rational inference of
Where plaintiffs evidence is
antitrust conspiracy. 5° '
susceptible of competing inferences, Matsushita extended the
then-existing reach of federal summary judgment, imposing
on the plaintiff the additional burden of presenting evidence
"'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged
conspirators acted independently."5 0
Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun and Stevens, criticized the majority for using
language that "suggests a departure from traditional
summary judgment doctrine."0 7 Justice White accused the
majority of adopting a summary judgment standard that
"invade[s] the factfinder's province"0 8 by "suggest[ing] that a
judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in
an antitrust case should go beyond the traditional summary
judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight
of the evidence favors the plaintiff."0 9 Justice White also
criticized the majority for using "unnecessarily broad and
confusing language" that could be interpreted as an invitation
to district court judges to substitute their judgment for that of
the jury:
If the Court intends to give every judge hearing a motion
for summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of
determining if the evidence makes the inference of
conspiracy more probable than not, it is overturning
settl6d law.... In defining what respondents must show
makes assumptions that invade the
to recover, the Court
510
L
factfinder's province.
Matsushita therefore increased the respondent's burden
on summary judgment in antitrust cases. Judge Patricia
Wald, Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, stated,
504.
(1986).
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
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[IUn contrast to the older notion that summary judgment
was frowned upon in "complex" cases, the Court stated [in
Matsushita] the "factual context" of a given claim can
ratchet up the obligation on the party opposing summary
judgment to come forward with "persuasive evidence" that
there is a genuine issue of material fact at bay. 511
Consistent with Matsushita, Justice Mosk's opinion in
Aguilar declares that in California, "summary judgment is
available, and always remains available, even in complex
cases," including antitrust actions for unlawful conspiracy
under the Cartwright Act.51 While conceding "the court may
not weigh the plaintiffs evidence or inferences against the
defendants' as though it were sitting as the trier of fact,"
Aguilar adopts Matsushita's summary judgment standard
requiring the nonmoving plaintiff to persuade the judge that
an inference of conspiracy is more likely than an inference of
permissible competition."' Thus, the preponderance of the
evidence burden of persuasion standard, which traditionally
informs the jury's deliberations, now informs the judge's
evaluation of plaintiffs antitrust evidence on summary
judgment.
Aguilar held that Aguilar's evidence was "at best
ambiguous... showing or implying conduct that was at least
as consistent with permissible competition by the petroleum
companies as independent actors, as with unlawful
conspiracy by them as colluding ones."514 It further held that
Aguilar failed to satisfy the additional burden that
Matsushita imposes on plaintiffs who oppose federal
summary judgment motions in such circumstances "to
present evidence that tend[s] to exclude the possibility that
the petroleum companies acted independently rather than
collusively."'
Justice Mosk's opinion expressly declined to decide
whether California "summary judgment law in this state now
conforms to its federal counterpart as clarified and liberalized
in Matsushita with respect to a plaintiffs 'implausible'

511.
512.
227.
513.
514.
515.

Wald, supra note 446, at 1907.
Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 518 (Cal. 2001); see supra note
Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 514.
Id. at 518.
Id.
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antitrust cause of action asserting an unlawful conspiracy
under section 1 of the Cartwright Act."" 6
It remains to be seen whether Aguilar's impact will
extend beyond antitrust actions and, like Matsushita'simpact
in federal court, encourage judges to weigh competing
inferences on summary judgment.
D. Lessons from the Federal Experience after the Celotex
Trilogy: Caveats for California Summary Judgment
The parallels between the federal summary judgment
trilogy and California's recent summary judgment trilogy are
striking. Both trilogies consist of high court decisions,
handed down within a period of several months, that were
carefully sequenced to culminate in a capstone decision:
Celotex in the federal trilogy, and Aguilar in the California
trilogy. In each instance, the capstone decision proclaimed
the liberation of summary judgment from the traditional
restrictions that placed on the moving defendant a burden of
production that it would not bear at trial, making it easier for
defendants to move for summary judgment."7 Each trilogy
announced a major shift in the judicial attitude surrounding
Prior to each trilogy, summary
summary judgment.
judgment was viewed as a "disfavored procedural shortcut"518
or, in the words of Justice Mosk, "a drastic measure that
deprives the losing party of a trial on the merits;... [one
which] should be used with caution, so that it does not
become a substitute for trial.""9 Each trilogy confirmed the
new role of summary judgment as a critically important tool
of efficient case management of crowded court dockets.520
516. Id. at 514 n.25 ("That is because, as even the petroleum companies
themselves admit, Aguilar's claim, whatever its merits, is far from
implausible.").
517. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (explaining that
the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for a
directed verdict under federal rules of civil procedure 50(a)); Aguilar, 23 P.3d at
512 ("Neither does summary judgment law in this state any longer require a
defendant moving for summary judgment to conclusively negate an element of
the plaintiffs cause of action. In this particular too, it now accords with federal
law.").
518. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
519. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 53 (Cal. 1998).
520. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 ("Summary judgment is properly regarded...
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."');
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A brief examination of the impact of the federal trilogy on
summary judgment practice in the federal courts holds some
important lessons for California courts about the potential
impact of the California trilogy.
The federal trilogy sent a signal to lower courts to use
summary judgment more aggressively to control burgeoning
dockets.52' According to one commentator's survey, lower
courts have responded to this signal by showing "a new
willingness to resolve issues of intent or motive at the
summary judgment stage, and, in the extreme version, to
grant summary judgment where 'taken as a whole, [plaintiffs'
evidence does not] exclude other reasonable hypothesis with a
fair amount of certainty."'522 A leading treatise on age
discrimination law confirms that at the federal level, "large
and increasing number[s] of ADEA cases are being resolved
at the summary judgment stage."52
Circuit Judge Wald
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 73 ("[Tlhe expansion of summary
judgment is designed to control both the volume of litigation overall and its
scope in any particular case."); BRUNET ET AL., supra note 117, at 65 ("In
Celotex , the Supreme Court transformed traditional burden-shifting rules in
summary judgment practice, and in so doing helped the device achieve its
intended goal of enhancing efficiency by avoiding unnecessary trials.").
521. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, at 468-69; John Kennedy,
Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v.
Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56., 6 REV. LITIG. 227, 251
(1987) ("[TIhe most significant ramifications of Celotex and its related cases may
be as much a matter of emphasis as of substance."); Stephen Caulkins,
Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating
Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1114-15 (1986) ("[Slince
many summary decisions turn less on precise phrasings of legal standards than
on attitudes toward the motion, the [Supreme Court's] celebration of summary
judgment may be more important than any reformulation of standards."); Paul
W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141,
164 (2000) ("[The actual holdings in Matsushita, Anderson and Celotex might
have been less important than the ceremonial crowning they gave to Rule 56.").
522. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 89. See also Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1161 (Cal. 2001) (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(discussing the California Supreme Court's imposition of a similar burden on
plaintiffs in Saelzler to negate alternative hypothetical scenarios with
certainty).
523. EGLIT, supra note 465, at 348. Eglit continues,
And while such rulings are very much fact-oriented and so afford little
basis for ready generalizations, it is safe to conclude that judicial
willingness to dispose of cases at the summary judgment stage is in
part a function of the attitudes of judges as to the proper role of
summary judgment in the employment discrimination context.
Id. Similarly, Paul Mollica, referring to his sampling of summary judgment
decisions during 1997-1998, expressed that
In a fair number of... employment [discrimination] cases, the
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reports that, in the D.C. Circuit, "[tihe courts have taken very
seriously indeed the Supreme Court's perceived invitation in
Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex to 'go forth, and grant
summary judgment."'5 4 Judge Wald reports that "[flederal
jurisprudence is largely the product of summary judgment in
civil cases."" 5 Based on her review of the 1996 civil docket in
the District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Wald
predicts "that we are approaching a time when a civil trial
will be thought of as a 'pathological event.' 5 6
These are signs that the premonitions of the dissenting
justices in both trilogies regarding the overuse of summary
judgment were not without substance. Circuit Judge Wald
warns that the federal courts have moved from underutilizing summary judgment to the opposite extreme, and
stresses the need to find an appropriate balance:
I believe our circuit's experience shows that we are now at
a stage where the focus should be on ensuring that
summary judgment stays within its proper boundaries,
rather than on encouraging its unimpeded growth. Its
expansion across subject matter boundaries and its
frequent conversion from a careful calculus of factual
disputes (or the lack thereof) to something more like a
gestalt verdict based on an early snapshot of the case have
turned it into a potential juggernaut which, if not
carefully monitored, could threaten the relatively small
residue of civil trials that remain. That appraisal may
seem alarmist, but my perusal of a sample of summary
judgments suggests that, at the very least, there is a real
danger of summary judgment being stretched far beyond
527
its originally intended or proper limits.
summary judgment went to the heart of the employer's

alleged

discriminatory intent. A few cases found that plaintiffs failed to prove
even a prima facie case of discrimination. A larger number of decisions
affirmed summary judgment by holding that the plaintiff could not
establish discriminatory intent, either directly or indirectly.
Mollica, supra note 521, at 168-69.
524. Wald, supra note 446, at 1926.
525. Id. at 1897. See also Mollica, supra note 521, at 141 (noting the

"emergence of summary judgment as the new fulcrum of federal civil dispute
resolution").
526. Wald, supra note 446, at 1915 ("And despite the high profile that
'alternative dispute resolution' has enjoyed in the past decade and a half,
summary judgment may in fact be the more commonly used mode of disposition
on the merits .... ).
527. Id. at 1917. See also Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 89
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IV. CONCLUSION AND POLITICAL POST-SCRIPT

The recent trilogy of California Supreme Court decisions
demonstrates that summary judgment law applicable in
California courts is virtually indistinguishable from federal
summary judgment law.
Like the federal trilogy, Guz,
Saelzler, and Aguilar have unleashed summary judgment
from its traditional restraints. The unanswered question is
how trial and appellate judges will apply this liberal standard
"on the ground" in the many factual settings of summary
judgment motions that will be decided by the courts. Will the
lower courts in California follow the example of their federal
counterparts by moving summary judgment practice from one
extreme to the other?
As California's summary judgment trilogy demonstrates,
judges differ sharply on the issue of legal sufficiency of the
evidence." 8 No bright line exists between questions of law to
be determined by a judge on summary judgment, and
questions of fact to be determined by a jury. The law-fact
distinction "involves an assessment of the proper division of
duties between the judge and jury, which in turn should be
guided by a proper application of the Seventh Amendment to
insure that courts do not usurp the function of the jury."2
Warning signals from the federal bench counsel caution in
the application of the liberal Celotex standard in California
courts."' If unchecked, unbalanced application of the new
summary judgment standard, in the zealous pursuit of
efficiency, could erode fundamental features of our civil
justice system including the value we place on a jury's
("There is evidence in the post-trilogy case law that summary judgment has
moved beyond its originally intended role as a guarantor of the existence of
material issues to be resolved at trial and has been transformed into a
mechanism to assess plaintiffs likelihood of prevailing at trial."). Mollica
likewise states that
some of the recent tendencies in summary judgment are suspect and
must be reconsidered. The 1997-98 case law sample highlights some of
these: arrogation of intent, reasonableness and even credibility
determinations. Combined with the strictness with which district
courts and courts of appeals enforce Rule 56, we have taken a sizable
risk that weak but valid causes of action - along with due process and
the Seventh Amendment jury right - may be sacrificed on the alter of
efficiency.
Mollica, supra note 521, at 205.
528. See supra notes 281, 303, 344-49, 460-61, 469, 478-81, and 487-505.
529. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 117, § 1.09, at 33.
530. See supra notes 521-24 and accompanying text.

2002]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

determination of facts and fact inferences, 3 ' and the due
process guarantee of a full and fair day in court. 32
Summary judgment is a politically charged procedural
device."3 Many commentators have written that summary
judgment favors "repeat-players (such as governments and

large employers) and more affluent defendants."5 34 The trial

bar opposes liberal use of summary judgment by the courts. 35
Political activity continues in the Democrat-controlled
California legislature to amend the summary judgment
statute to restore summary judgment to its pre-Union Bank
status.53

The latest of these legislative initiatives, SB 476,

passed the state Senate in spring 2001 and seemed headed
passage in the Democrat-controlled
for unimpeded
37
Assembly.

Surprisingly, efforts to enact SB 476 were suspended for
531. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 166, stating that
the jury determinations of fact existence and fact inference serve other
values as well: the infusion of community standards into litigation;
promoting public confidence in the judicial system and fairness of
litigation results; maintaining democratic values of participation; and
citizen access to the system... Revised rules of summary judgment,
directed verdict, and judgment n.o.v. that reduce jury participation
undermine these values and consequently diminish the system as a
whole.
532. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
If the forum state wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim
for money damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal
procedural due process protection. The plaintiff must receive notice
plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation,
whether in person or through counsel.
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 477 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
533. For a more detailed discussion of the politics of summary judgment, see
Koppel, supra note 128.
534. Mollica, supra note 521, at 194. See also Issacharoff & Loewenstein,
supra note 12, at 75 ("[S]ummary judgment fundamentally alters the balance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the costs and risks to
plaintiffs in the pretrial phases of litigation while diminishing both for
defendants.").
535. Walters, supra note 356, at A3 ("In general, the lawyers [who specialize
in personal injury cases] want to make it more difficult for judges to toss out
suits while business groups and insurers, often the target of personal injury
cases, want to keep the law as it is.").
536. For an account of post-Union Bank efforts, in 1996, in the Republicancontrolled California legislature to amend the summary judgment statute to
explicitly conform to the federal standard under Celotex, see Koppel, supra note
128, at 533-42.
537. Steele, supra note 138. The plaintiffs bar, represented by the Consumer
Attorneys of California, co-sponsored SB 476.
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the current legislative session as a direct result of the death
of Justice Mosk, who authored the Aguilar opinion."'
According to one political commentator:
By happenstance, Mosk issued his ruling and died just as
lobbyists for personal injury lawyers were readying their
final push on legislation that would rewrite the summary
judgment rules and make it tougher for judges to toss out
suits.... The timing couldn't have been worse for the
lawyers. If they and Sen. Martha Escutia, D-Los Angeles,
moved the bill, they would be accused of besmirching
Mosk's final legacy - just days after they had heaped
praise on his memory. The lawyers and Escutia put the
bill on indefinite hold ....

The debate in the legislature and in the courts over the
appropriate role of summary judgment should proceed not
from partisan efforts to achieve the tactical high ground in
litigation, but from a shared willingness to utilize the
procedure for the "common good." 4 ° The goal should be to
serve the public interest in an accessible and efficient civil
justice system that affords litigants just and speedy results, 4 '
without sacrificing either justice or speed.

538. Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493 (2001).
539. Walters, supra note 356, at A3.
540. Stempel, supra note 84, at 751.
541. See FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 1 ("These rules... shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.").

